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AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE MASTER CLASS: 
THE CREATION OF THE PROSLAVERY CONSTITUTION 
 
By  
 
Paul Finkelman* 
 
 
At the turn of the Twentieth Century the great black scholar W.E.B. DuBois 
predicted that “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line.”1 
 As we face the Twenty-First Century, it seems likely that the problem of the color line 
will remain.  Race remains America’s greatest social problem, as it has since before the 
founding of the nation.  Since 1776 Americans have repeatedly failed to implement our 
national credo, that all people “are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of 
Happiness.”2 
 
In sometimes aggressive, and sometime half-hearted ways, Americans have tried to 
solve the problem of racial inequality.  Most recently the culture tried “affirmative 
action,” which was designed to affirmatively try to bring about equality of opportunity 
and even of outcome.3  In the last decade courts have chipped away at affirmative 
action, and in many ways made it unusable as a tool to redress past and present 
discrimination.4  Sometime in the early Twenty-First Century we are likely to see the 
end of affirmative action.   
 
Whether the demise of affirmative action is good public policy or not is beyond the 
scope of this article.  However, as we think about race, and its place in our society, it is 
                                                 
*John F. Seiberling Professor of Constitutional Law, The University of Akron School of 
Law.  This was originally presented as the Second Annual Ralph Regula Lecture at The 
University of Akron School of Law in 1998. 
1  W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS 13 (1904). 
2  DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
3  See generally Paul Finkelman, The Color of Law, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 937 (1993) (reviewing 
ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992)) (describing the history of the use of 
race in American law); Paul Finkelman, The Rise of the New Racism, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
245 (1996) (reviewing DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL 
SOCIETY (1995)) (describing the recent conservative backlash to affirmative action and the 
attack on civil rights policy). 
4  See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 489 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200 (1995); Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), rev’g 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. 
Tex. 1994), reh’g denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996); see 
generally AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTION VOLS. 1-3 (Gabriel J. Chin & Paul 
Finkelman eds., 1998). 
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useful to remember that when the United States began as a nation, it adopted an 
aggressive policy of affirmative action, written into the Constitution in many ways.  
That policy was designed to affirmatively protect slavery and slaveowners. 
 
The Constitution of 1787 was a proslavery document, designed to prevent any 
national assault on slavery, while at the same time structured to protect the interests of 
slaveowners at the expense of African Americans and their antislavery white allies.  To 
understand this earliest form of affirmative action, I begin with a view of the 
Constitution first articulated by the great abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison, and then 
turn to an examination of the Convention that wrote the Constitution and the document 
that convention produced. 
 
I.  THE GARRISONIAN CONSTITUTION 
 
William Lloyd Garrison, the great nineteenth century abolitionist, thought the 
Constitution was the result of a terrible bargain between freedom and slavery.  The 
American states were, in Garrison’s words, united by a “covenant with death” and “an 
agreement with Hell.”5  Garrison and his followers refused to participate in American 
electoral politics, because to do so they would have had to support “the present pro-
slavery, war sanctioning Constitution of the United States.”6  Instead, under the slogan 
“No Union with Slaveholders,” the Garrisonians repeatedly argued for a dissolution of 
the union.7 
 
Part of the Garrisonians’ opposition to continuing the Union stemmed from their 
desire to avoid the corruption that came from participating in a government created by 
the proslavery Constitution.  But their position was also at least theoretically pragmatic. 
 The Garrisonians were convinced that the legal protection of slavery in the Constitution 
made political activity futile, while support for the Constitution merely strengthened the 
stranglehold slavery had on America.  In 1845, Wendell Phillips, Garrison’s close friend 
and the most brilliant abolitionist speaker, pointed out that in the years since the 
adoption of the Constitution, Americans had witnessed “the slaves trebling in numbers--
slaveholders monopolizing the offices and dictating the policy of the Government--
prostituting the strength and influence of the Nation to the support of slavery here and 
elsewhere--trampling on the rights of the free States, and making the courts of the 
country their tools.”8  Phillips argued that this experience proved “that it is impossible 
                                                 
5  William Lloyd Garrison, THE LIBERATOR , May 6, 1842, at 3.  See also JAMES BREWER 
STEWART , HOLY WARRIORS:  THE ABOLITIONISTS AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 98-99 (1976). 
6  Letter from William Lloyd Garrison to Rev. Samuel J. May (July 17, 1845), in 3 THE 
LETTERS OF WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, at 303 (Walter M. Merrill, ed., 1973). 
7  WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 
1760-1848, at 228-248 (1977) [hereinafter SOURCES]. 
8 WENDELL PHILLIPS, CAN ABOLITIONISTS VOTE OR TAKE OFFICE UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 3 (1845). 
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for free and slave States to unite on any terms, without all becoming partners in the 
guilt and responsible for the sin of slavery.”9 
 
The Garrisonians did not necessarily see the Constitution as the result of a deliberate 
conspiracy of evil men; rather, they understood it to be the consequence of political 
give-and-take at the Convention of 1787.  Indeed, before the publication of Madison’s 
convention notes, the Garrisonians were not disunionist, and while unhappy with the 
Constitutional protections of slavery, were not yet ready to condemn the whole 
document.  Some even argued that the Constitution favored liberty.  However, the 
publication of The Madison Papers, which included Madison’s notes on the 
Convention, convinced Garrison and his followers that the Constitution was in fact 
proslavery.  Rev. Samuel J. May, for example, recalled “the publication of the ‘Madison 
Papers’ . . . I confess, disconcerted me somewhat.  I could not so easily maintain my 
ground in the discussions which afterwards agitated so seriously the Abolitionists 
themselves,--some maintaining that the Constitution was, and was intended to be, 
proslavery.”10   
 
Thus, in his penetrating examination of the Convention, The Constitution A Pro-
Slavery Compact; or, Selections from the Madison Papers, Wendell Phillips analyzed 
“that ‘compromise,’ which was made between slavery and freedom, in 1787; granting 
to the slaveholder distinct privileges and protection for his slave property, in return for 
certain commercial concessions on his part toward the North.”11  Using Madison’s 
papers, Phillips argued that “the Nation at large were fully aware of this bargain at the 
time, and entered into it willingly and with open eyes.”12  Phillips both exaggerated and 
understated the nature of the relationship between slavery and the Constitution.  
Certainly, some of those at the Convention “entered into” the bargain with great 
reservations, and many at the ratifying conventions may indeed not have seen the full 
extent of the “bargain.”  On the other hand, the bargain involved more than commerce 
and slavery, it concerned the very creation of the Union itself. 
 
Other nineteenth century antislavery thinkers disagreed with the Garrisonians.  
Salmon P. Chase, the most successful antebellum abolitionist politician, fought 
throughout the antebellum period to convince his colleagues, the judiciary, and northern 
voters that the Constitution was really antislavery.13 Despite his creative attempts, 
                                                 
9 Id. 
10  SAMUEL J. MAY, SOME RECOLLECTIONS OF OUR ANTISLAVERY CONFLICT 143 (1869).  May 
offered this confession after the Civil War was over, when he could “rejoice, therefore, with 
joy unspeakable that the question is at length practically settled . . . .”  Id. at 144. 
11  WENDELL PHILLIPS, THE CONSTITUTION:  A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT; OR, SELECTIONS 
FROM THE MADISON PAPERS 5 (2d. ed. 1845). 
12  Id. at 6. 
13  See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:  THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-102 (1970); see also  SALMON P. CHASE, AN 
ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
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Chase’s efforts failed.  The United States Supreme Court almost always protected 
slavery in the cases it heard.14  Likewise, almost all American presidents and their 
cabinet officers protected slavery in foreign and domestic politics.  Perhaps most 
frustrating to the political abolitionists was the fact that some of their most brilliant allies 
in the crusade against slavery--the Garrisonians--agreed with their enemies on the 
meaning of the Constitution.  Thus, one Ohio Liberty Party man ruefully noted after 
reading Wendell Phillips’ pamphlet on the Constitution: “Garrison, Phillips, and Quincy; 
Calhoun, Rhett, and McDuffie; all harmoniously laboring to prevent such a construction 
of the Constitution as would abolish slavery.”15 
 
A careful reading of the Constitution reveals that the Garrisonians were correct:  the 
national compact did favor slavery.  A detailed examination of the Convention of 1787 
explains how the Constitution evolved in this way.  Both the text of the Constitution and 
the debates surrounding it help us understand that the “more perfect Union” created by 
this document was in fact fundamentally imperfect. 
 
II.  SLAVERY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE  
 
The word “slavery” appears in only one place in the Constitution--in the Thirteenth 
Amendment, where the institution is abolished.  Throughout the main body of the 
Constitution, slaves are referred to as “other persons,” “such persons,” or in the 
singular as a “person held to Service or Labour.”  Why is this the case? 
 
Throughout the debates the delegates talked about “blacks,” “Negroes,” and 
                                                                                                                         
AT THE DECEMBER TERM, 1846, IN THE CASE OF WHARTON JONES VS. JOHN VAN ZANDT photo. 
reprint in FUGITIVE SLAVES AND AMERICAN COURTS: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE, SERIES II, 
VOL. 1 at 341 (Paul Finkelman ed., Garland Publishing Co. 1988) (1847).  This was Chase’s 
written brief in Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).  Here Chase was unsuccessful 
in his attempt to persuade the Supreme Court to overturn the verdict against Van Zandt for 
helping a group of fugitive slaves claimed by Jones.  
14See William M. Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before The United States Supreme 
Court, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34, 47-49 (1978-1979).  Chase’s only success before the Supreme Court 
was in Norris v. Crocker, which turned on a technical aspect of a statute 54 U.S. (13 How.) 
429 (1851).  See Paul Finkelman, Fugitive Slaves, Midwestern Racial Tolerance, and the 
Value of Justice Delayed, 78 IOWA L. REV. 89, 105-07 (1992).  The only other antislavery 
success before the Supreme Court was in United States v. Amistad, which involved the illegal 
African slave trade and issues of international law.  40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).  The 
Garrisonian analysis was not, of course, designed to give aid and comfort to defenders of 
slavery.  The Garrisonians merely read the Constitution and the debates of the Convention 
and analyzed what they found.  Similarly, an acceptance of the Garrisonian view of the 
Constitution-that it was a document which explicitly protected the institution of slavery-is not 
an endorsement of the Garrisonian cure:  a rejection of political activity and disunion. 
15  Letter from George Bradburn to Gerritt Smith (Dec. 15, 1846) (Gerritt Smith Papers, box 4, 
on file at Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York). 
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“slaves.”  But the final document avoided these terms.  The change in language was 
clearly designed to make the Constitution more palatable to the North.  In a debate over 
representation, William Patterson of New Jersey pointed out that the Congress under 
the Articles of Confederation “had been ashamed to use the term ‘Slaves’ & had 
substituted a description.”16  This shame over the word slave came up at the 
Convention during the debate over the African slave trade.  The delegates from the 
Carolinas and Georgia vigorously demanded that the African trade remain open under 
the new Constitution.  Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, unable to contain his anger 
over this immoral compromise, suggested that the proposed clause read: the 
“Importation of slaves into N. Carolina, S-- Carolina & Georgia” shall not be 
prohibited.17  Connecticut’s Roger Sherman, who voted with the deep South to allow 
the trade, objected, not only to the singling out of specific states, but also to the term 
slave.  He declared he “liked a description better than the terms proposed, which had 
been declined by the old Congs & were not pleasing to some people.”18  George Clymer 
of Pennsylvania “concurred with Mr. Sherman” on this issue.19  In the North Carolina 
ratifying convention James Iredell, who had been a delegate in Philadelphia, explained 
that “[T]he word slave is not mentioned” because “[t]he northern delegates, owing to 
their particular scruples on the subject of slavery, did not choose the word slave to be 
mentioned.”20  Thus, southerners avoided the term because they did not want 
unnecessarily to antagonize their colleagues from the North.  As long as they were 
assured of protection for their institution, the southerners at the Convention were 
willing to do without the word “slave.”21 
 
Despite the circumlocution, the Constitution directly sactioned slavery in five 
provisions:22 
                                                 
16  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 561 (Max Farrand ed. rev. ed. 
1966) [hereinafter RECORDS]. 
17  2 id. at 415. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. 
20  4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 176 (Jonathon Elliot ed., Burt Franklin 1987) (1888) [hereinafter DEBATES]. 
21  STAUGHTON LYND, CLASS CONFLICT, SLAVERY, AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:  
TEN ESSAYS  159-60 (1967).   
22  Curiously, Don Fehrenbacher finds that “only three [clauses of the Constitution] were 
directly and primarily concerned with the institution of slavery.”  Fehrenbacher acknowledges 
only that other clauses “impinged upon slavery.”  Fehrenbacher also asserts that “the 
Constitution had some bias toward freedom but was essentially open-ended with respect to 
slavery.”  Fehrenbacher fails, however, to explain what part of the Constitution was 
profreedom, while at the same time ignoring many proslavery aspects of the Constitution.  
DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY 3, 6 (1984).  For an analysis 
of the Constitution closer to the one presented here, see SOURCES, supra note 7, at 62.  
Wiecek lists 11 separate clauses in the Constitution that “directly or indirectly accommodated 
the peculiar institution,” but makes no distinction between direct and indirect protections of 
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Art. I, § 2. Cl. 3.  The three fifths clause provided for counting three-fifths of all 
slaves for purposes of representation in Congress.  This clause also provided that, if 
any “direct tax” was levied on the states, it could be imposed only proportionately, 
according to population, and that only three-fifths of all slaves would be counted in 
assessing what each state’s contribution would be. 
 
Art. I, § 9, Cl. 1.  This clause prohibited Congress from banning the “Migration or 
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to 
admit” before the year 1808.  Awkwardly phrased and designed to confuse readers, 
this clause prevented Congress from ending the African slave trade before 1808, but 
did not require Congress to ban the trade after that date.  The clause was a 
significant exception to the general power granted to Congress to regulate all 
commerce. 
 
Art. I, § 9, Cl. 4.  This clause declared that any “capitation” or other “direct tax” had 
to take into account the three-fifths clause.  It ensured that, if a head tax were ever 
levied, slaves would be taxed at three-fifths the rate of whites.  The “direct tax” 
portion of this clause was redundant, because that was provided for in the three-
fifths clause. 
 
Art. IV, § 2, Cl. 3.  The fugitive slave clause prohibited the states from emancipating 
fugitive slaves and required that runaways be returned to their owners “on demand.” 
 
Art.V. This article prohibited any amendment of the slave importation or capitation 
clauses before 1808. 
 
Taken together, these five provisions gave the South a strong claim to “special 
treatment” for its peculiar institution.  The three-fifths clause also gave the South extra 
political muscle--in the House of Representatives and in the electoral college--to support 
that claim. 
 
Numerous other clauses of the Constitution supplemented the five clauses that 
directly protected slavery.  Some provisions that indirectly guarded slavery, such as the 
prohibition on taxing exports, were included primarily to protect the interests of 
slaveholders.  Others, such as the guarantee of federal support to “suppress 
Insurrections” and the creation of the electoral college, were written with slavery in 
mind, although delegates also supported them for reasons having nothing to do with 
slavery.  The most prominent indirect protections of slavery were: 
 
Art. I, § 8, Cl. 15.  The domestic insurrections clause empowered Congress to call 
                                                                                                                         
slavery.  Id. at 62-63. 
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“forth the Militia” to “suppress Insurrections,” including slave rebellions.23 
 
Art. I, § 9, Cl. 5.  This clause prohibited federal taxes on exports and thus prevented 
an indirect tax on slavery by taxing the staple products of slave labor, such as 
tobacco, rice, and eventually cotton. 
 
Art. I, § 10, Cl. 2.  This clause prohibited the states from taxing exports or imports, 
thus preventing an indirect tax on the products of slave labor by a nonslaveholding 
state.24  This was especially important to the slave states because almost all slave 
states produced export products-- tobacco, rice, and eventually cotton, were 
shipped out of Northern ports. 
 
Art. II, § 1, Cl. 2.  This clause provided for the indirect election of the president 
through an electoral college based on congressional representation.  This provision 
incorporated the three-fifths clause into the electoral college and gave whites in slave 
states a disproportionate influence in the election of the president.  This clause had a 
major impact on the politics of slavery as well as American history in general.  
Thomas Jefferson’s victory in the election of 1800 would be possible only because 
of the electoral votes the southern states gained on account of their slaves.  Thus 
Jefferson, who spent most of his career either avoiding any conflict over slavery or 
protecting slavery, was elevated to the Presidency in part because of slavery.25  
 
Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 1.  This clause allowed for the admission of new states.  The 
delegates to the Convention anticipated the admission of new slave states to the 
Union. 
 
Art. IV, § 4.  In the domestic violence provision of the guarantee clause the United 
States government promised to protect states from “domestic Violence,” including 
slave rebellions. 
 
Art. V.   By requiring a three-fourths majority of the states to ratify any amendment to 
the Constitution, this Article ensured that the slaveholding states would have a 
perpetual veto over any constitutional changes.26 
                                                 
23  Wendell Phillips considered this clause, and the clause in Art. IV, § 4, to be among the 
five key proslavery provisions of the Constitution.  PHILLIPS, supra  note 11, at 6. 
24  Although no slave state would have levied such a tax, a free state like New York, 
Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania might conceivably have taxed products produced in other 
states but exported through the harbors of New York, Boston, or Philadelphia. 
25  PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF 
JEFFERSON 105-37 (1996). 
26  Had all 15 slave states remained in the Union, they would to this day be able to prevent 
an amendment on any subject.  In a 50-state union, it takes only 13 states to block any 
amendment. 
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Finally, some clauses did not inherently favor slavery, and were not necessarily 
considered to affect slavery when they were debated, but ultimately protected the 
institution when interpreted by the courts or implemented by Congress after the 
adoption of the Constitution.  It would be wrong to argue that these illustrate the 
proslavery nature of the Constitutional Convention.  However, these clauses do illustrate 
the way the Constitution set a proslavery tone, which led Congress and the Courts to 
interpret seemingly neutral clauses in favor of slavery.  Such clauses also directly 
challenge William W. Freehling’s argument that the Framers were inherently antislavery 
and that “The impact of the Founding Fathers on slavery . . .  must be seen in the long 
run not in terms of what changed in the late eighteenth century but in terms of how the 
Revolutionary experience changed the whole of American antebellum history.”27  If we 
look at the “long run” impact of the Constitution on “American antebellum history” we 
find that the following clauses were used to protect slavery, not to harm it. 
 
Art. I, § 8, Cl. 4.   The naturalization clause allowed Congress to prohibit the 
naturalization of non-whites, even though it is likely that some of the new states, 
especially those which granted equality to blacks, would have also allowed foreign-
born blacks to become citizens. 
 
Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17.   The federal district clause allowed Congress to regulate 
institutions, including slavery, in what became the national capital.  Under this clause 
Congress allowed slavery in Washington, D.C.  During the Convention southerners 
expressed fear that the national capital would be in the North. 
 
Art. III, § 2, Cl. 1.  The diversity jurisdiction clause limited the right to sue in federal 
courts to “Citizens of different States,” rather than inhabitants.  This clause allowed 
judges to deny slaves and free blacks access to federal courts.28 
 
Art. IV, § 1.  The full faith and credit clause required each state to grant legal 
recognition to the laws and judicial proceedings of other states, thus obligating free 
states to recognize laws creating and protecting slavery. 
 
Art. IV, § 2, Cl. 1.  The privileges and immunities clause required that states grant 
equal privileges and immunities to “citizens” of other states, while denying these 
protections to slaves and free blacks.29 
                                                 
27  William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and Slavery, 77 AMER. HIST. REV. 81, 82 
(1972).  
28  The proslavery implications of this clause did not become fully apparent until the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford , 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  
There the Court held that even free blacks could not sue in diversity in federal courts. 
29  Throughout the antebellum period the slave states refused to grant privileges and 
immunities to free blacks from other states or countries.  Most of the slave states prohibited 
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Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2.  This clause allowed Congress the power to regulate the territories. 
 In 1820 Congress used this clause to limit slavery in the territories, but in Dred 
Scott v. Sandford the Supreme Court ruled that the clause authorized Congress to 
protect slavery in the territories, but not to ban the institution.30 
 
Besides specific clauses of the Constitution, the structure of the entire document 
ensured against emancipation by the new federal government.  Because the Constitution 
created a government of limited powers, Congress lacked the power to interfere in the 
domestic institutions of the states.31  Thus, during the ratification debates only the most 
fearful southern antifederalists opposed the Constitution on the grounds that it 
threatened slavery.  Most southerners, even those who opposed the Constitution for 
other reasons, agreed with General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 
who crowed to his state’s house of representatives: 
 
We have a security that the general government can never emancipate them, for no 
such authority is granted and it is admitted, on all hands, that the general 
government has no powers but what are expressly granted by the Constitution, and 
that all rights not expressed were reserved by the several states.32 
 
                                                                                                                         
free blacks from even entering their jurisdictions.  In Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 
(1823), Supreme Court Justice William Johnson refused to strike down such a law in South 
Carolina, although he believed it to be unconstitutional.  For more on this problem, see PAUL 
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 109 n.28 (1981); PAUL 
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 256-63 (1985) (discussing Elkison); Paul Finkelman, 
States’ Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125-158 (Kermit L. Hall and James W. 
Ely, Jr., eds., 1989); The Protection of Black Rights in Seward’s New York , 34 CIV. WAR. 
HIST. 211-234 (1988). 
30  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney held unconstitutional 
the Missouri Compromise, which banned slavery in most of the western territories. 
31  Under various clauses of the Constitution the Congress might have protected, limited, 
or prohibited the interstate slave trade (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3), slavery in the District of Columbia or 
on military bases (Art. I, § 8, Cl. 17), or slavery in the territories (Art. IV, § 3, Cl. 2).  None of 
these clauses permitted Congress to touch slavery in the states.  Some radical abolitionists 
argued that under the guarantee clause, Art. IV, § 4, Congress had the right to end slavery in 
the states.  See SOURCES, supra  note 7, at 269-271.  The delegates in Philadelphia did not 
debate these clauses with slavery in mind, although, as will be shown in Part IV of this essay, 
the commerce clause was accepted as part of a bargain over the african slave trade. 
32  4 DEBATES , supra  note 20, at 286.  Patrick Henry, using any argument he could find to 
oppose the Constitution, feared that, “[a]mong ten thousand implied powers which they may 
assume, they may, if we be engaged in war, liberate every one of your slaves if they please.”  
3 id. at 589.  Ironically, the implied war powers of the president would be used to end slavery, 
but only after the South had renounced the Union.  
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The Constitution was not “essentially open-ended with respect to slavery,” as Don 
Fehrenbacher has argued.33  Nor is it true, as Earl Maltz has argued, that “the 
Constitution . . . took no position on the basic institution of slavery.”34  On the 
contrary, the Constitution provided enormous protections for the peculiar institution of 
the South at very little cost to that region.  At the Virginia ratifying convention Edmund 
Randolph denied that the Constitution posed any threat at all to slavery.  He challenged 
opponents of the Constitution to show, “Where is the part that has a tendency to the 
abolition of slavery?”35  He answered his own question asserting, “Were it right here to 
mention what passed in [the Philadelphia] convention . . . I might tell you that the 
Southern States, even South Carolina herself, conceived this property to be secure” and 
that “there was not a member of the Virginia delegation who had the smallest suspicion 
of the abolition of slavery.”36  South Carolinians, who had already ratified the 
Constitution, would have agreed with Randolph.  In summing up the entire Constitution, 
General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who had been one of the ablest defenders of 
slavery at the Convention, proudly told the South Carolina House of Representatives: “In 
short, considering all circumstances, we have made the best terms for the security of 
this species of property it was in our power to make.  We would have made better if 
we could; but on the whole, I do not think them bad.”37 
 
General Pinckney had good reason to be proud of his role in Philadelphia.  
Throughout the Convention Pinckney and other delegates from the Deep South 
tenaciously fought to protect the interests of slaveholders.  In these struggles they were 
usually successful. 
 
When they arrived at the Convention the delegates probably did not think slavery 
would be a pressing issue.  Rivalries between large and small states appeared to pose 
the greatest obstacle to a stronger Union.  The nature or representation in Congress; the 
power of the national government to levy taxes, regulate commerce, and pay off the 
nation’s debts; the role of the states under a new constitution; and the power of the 
executive were on the agenda.  Yet, as the delegates debated these issues, the 
importance of slavery--and the sectional differences it caused--became clear.38  
                                                 
33  FEHRENBACHER, supra  note 22, at 6 n.2. 
34  Earl Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Constitution, 36 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 466, 468 (1992).  Maltz argues that because of its respect for federalism the Constitution 
did not affect slavery as it existed in the states.  Id.  However, the Constitution interfered with 
the power of the states in other areas, such as denying them the right to abridge contracts, 
coin money, set up their own foreign policy, or tax exports or imports.  Surely it would not 
have been beyond the scope of the Constitution to allow Congress to regulate slavery in the 
states in a number of ways. 
35  3 DEBATES , supra  note 20, at 598. 
36  Id. at 599. 
37  4 id. at 286. 
38  It is perhaps an exaggeration to assert , as Staughton Lynd has, that the “sectional 
conflict between North and South was the major tension in the Convention,” simply because 
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/1
1999] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE MASTER CLASS 
Throughout the summer of 1787 slavery emerged to complicate almost every debate.  
Most important by far was the way slavery figured in the lengthy debate over 
representation. 
 
III.  SLAVERY AND CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION 
 
On May 29, Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia submitted the series of 
resolutions known as the Virginia Plan to the Convention.  Randolph introduced these 
resolutions in response to the “crisis” of the nation “and the necessity of preventing the 
fulfilment[sic] of the prophecies of the American downfal[sic].”39  This plan would 
create an entirely new form of government in the United States.  The power of the 
central government would be vastly enhanced at the expense of the states.  The new 
Congress would have greater powers to tax, to secure the nation “against foreign 
invasion,” to settle disagreements between states, and to regulate commerce.40 
 
Randolph’s plan called for a radical restructuring of the American government by 
making population the basis for representation in the national Congress.  Under the 
Articles of Confederation, each state had one vote in Congress.  By changing the basis 
of representation to population, Randolph’s plan immediately created tensions between 
the large and small states at the Convention.  But the plan also raised the dilemma of 
whether slaves would be counted for the purposes of determining how many 
representatives each state would get in the new Congress.  This dilemma of how to 
count slaves, or whether to count them at all, would trouble the delegates throughout 
the Convention. 
 
Virginia was the most populous state in the nation, and thus Randolph had a vested 
interest in basing Congressional representation on population.  But how that population 
would be counted greatly affected the potential representation of Virginia and the rest of 
the South.  Virginia’s white population, as the 1790 census would reveal, was only 
slightly larger than Pennsylvania’s.  If representation were based solely on free persons, 
the North would overwhelm the South.41  But if slaves were counted equally with free 
                                                                                                                         
there were so many other “major” tensions.  LYND, supra  note 21, at 159-60.  It is clear, 
however, that sectional conflicts and the role of slavery in the new nation caused as much 
tension as any other individual issue. 
39  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 18. 
40  Id. 
41  In the first Congress the North had 35 representatives and the South had 30.  However, 
after the first federal census the original northern states had 55 members of Congress, the 
southern states had only 44.  Had slaves not been counted for congressional representation, 
the South’s members of the House after 1790 would have been only about 34.  In this article I 
consider the North to be those states which ended slavery before the beginning of the Civil 
War and the South to include those states which retained slavery until the War.  Thus, I 
consider Delaware to be a southern state, but not New Jersey or New York, although neither 
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persons, the Virginia delegation would be overwhelmingly larger than the delegation of 
any other state, and the South would have more members of Congress than the North.  
The Virginians, of course, realized that the northern states were unlikely to embrace 
enthusiastically a system of government that counted slaves for purposes of 
representation.  Thus, Randolph’s plan hedged the issue, declaring “that the rights of 
suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of 
contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem 
best in different cases.”42  Randolph’s avoidance of the term “slaves” by referring to 
“Quotas of contribution” indicates the sensitivity of the subject. 
 
Squabbling over slavery began in earnest the next day, May 30.  James Madison 
moved to delete the term “free inhabitants” from the Virginia Plan because he felt the 
phrase “might occasion debates which would divert” attention “from the general 
question whether the principle of representation should be changed” from states to 
population.43  Madison understood that an early debate on the role of slavery in the 
Union might destroy the Convention before it got started.  But his proposal would have 
left representation based solely on “Quotas of contribution,” and this was also 
unacceptable to most delegates.  Madison himself agreed “that some better rule ought to 
be found.”44  Alexander Hamilton then proposed that representation be based solely on 
the number of “free inhabitants” in each state.45  This proposal was also too volatile and 
the delegates quickly tabled it.  Other attempts at compromise failed.  Finally, the 
Delaware delegates helped put a temporary end to this divisive discussion by telling the 
Convention that they “were restrained by their commission from assenting to any 
change on the rule of suffrage,” and if the body endorsed any change in representation, 
they would be forced to leave the Convention.  The Convention, having successfully 
postponed this acrimonious debate, adjourned for the day.46 
 
The Convention intermittently debated representation for the next two weeks, but it 
was not until June 11 that the issue of slavery reemerged to complicate the debate.  On 
that day the Convention considered for the first time, and also approved provisionally, 
                                                                                                                         
had taken steps to end slavery before the Convention.  New York passed its gradual 
emancipation act in 1799, New Jersey in 1804. 
42  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 20.  In 1790 Virginia had a free population of 454,983.  The 
next largest free populations were Pennsylvania, 430,630; Massachusetts, 378,693; and New 
York, 318,824.  Virginia also had 292,627 slaves, whereas the entire North had only 40,089 
slaves. 
43  Id. at 36. 
44  Id. 
45  Id. 
46  Id. at 37-38.  It seems likely that the Delaware delegation exaggerated the constraints on 
their commission in a shrewd attempt to avoid a potentially catastrophic debate over slavery 
and representation.  When the Convention did in fact adopt representation based on 
population, the Delaware delegates remained and did not threaten to leave. 
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the three-fifths clause.  Over the next three months the Convention would, on a number 
of occasions, redebate and reconsider the three-fifths clause before finally adopting it.47 
 
The evolution of the three-fifths clause during the Convention shows that the clause 
was not essentially a compromise over taxation and representation, as historians have 
traditionally claimed, and as the structure of Article I, § 2, Cl. 3 implies.48   Rather, it 
began as a compromise between those who wanted to count slaves fully for purposes 
of representation and those who did not want to count slaves at all.  Thus, on this 
crucial question the slave states won a critical victory without making any important 
concessions. 
 
On June 11, Roger Sherman of Connecticut proposed that representation be based 
on the “numbers of free inhabitants” in each state.49  John Rutledge and Pierce Butler of 
South Carolina objected, arguing for representation according to “quotas of 
contribution,” which had become a euphemism for counting slaves in a formula for 
representation.50  James Wilson and Charles Pinckney, the younger cousin of General 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, skillfully headed off the Rutledge-Butler proposal. 
 
Wilson proposed and Pinckney seconded, a motion that ultimately became the three-
fifths clause.  Here for the first time was an example of cooperation between the North 
and the South over slavery.  Significantly, Wilson was known to dislike slavery and 
came from a state, Pennsylvania, which had already adopted a gradual emancipation 
                                                 
47  Approval by the Convention did not mean permanent adoption, for until June 20 the 
Convention debated the proposed Constitution as a Committee of the Whole, which allowed 
for full discussion without binding the delegates to any final resolution of an issue.  
Anything approved by the Convention as a Committee of the Whole would have to be voted 
on again when the Convention was in regular session.  Furthermore, under the standing rules 
of the Convention, delegates were free to ask for a reconsideration of decisions on one day’s 
notice.  Finally, all clauses of the new Constitution were eventually sent to two drafting 
committees, the Committee of Detail and the Committee of Style.  The reports of these 
committees were also subject to full debate and amendment by the entire Convention. 
48  Historians presenting the traditional view include FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE STORY 
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES  131 (1891); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES  108 (1913); CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 290-291, 584-586 (1928); CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 173, 
188-189 (1966).   
49  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 196. 
50  Id.  This motion by Sherman somewhat undermines the traditional notion of a split 
between the “small” and “large” state over representation.  Sherman, from the small state of 
Connecticut, was willing to accept population as a basis for representation in the lower house 
of the legislature, as long as slaves were not counted, and provided that there was equality in 
the upper house.  A week earlier George Mason of Virginia had suggested the importance of 
sectionalism in a long speech arguing for an executive “vested in three persons, one chosen 
from the Northern, one from the Middle, and one from the Southern States”  Id. at 112-13. 
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scheme.  Nevertheless, harmony at the Convention was more important to Wilson than 
the place of slavery in the new nation.  By teaming up, the nominally antislavery 
Pennsylvanian and the rabidly proslavery Carolinian may have hoped to undercut the 
antislavery sentiments of other northern delegates while also satisfying the demands of 
the proslavery delegates like Butler and Rutledge.51 
 
Most delegates seemed to accept this proposal.  However, Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts was unwilling to compromise.  With some irony he protested, “Blacks 
are property, and are used to the southward as horses and cattle to the northward; and 
why should their representation be increased to the southward on account of the 
number of slaves, than horses or oxen to the north?”52  Gerry believed this would be an 
appropriate rule for taxation, but not for representation, because under it four southern 
voters would have more political power than ten northern voters.53  He also argued that 
this clause would degrade freemen in the North by equating them with slaves.54  He 
wondered “Are we to enter into a Compact with Slaves?”55  No other northerner 
opposed representation for slaves at this time, and the Convention sitting as a 
Committee of the Whole voted in favor of the three-fifths clause. 
 
Thus, with little debate the Convention initially accepted the three-fifths clause as a 
basis for representation.  The clause, which would give the South enormous political 
leverage in the nation, was accepted without any quid pro quo from the South.  
Application of the clause to taxation would not come until later in the Convention.  
Indeed, there was no reason in mid-June to believe it would ever be applied to taxation. 
 A brief history of the three-fifths ratio, prior to 1787, bears this out. 
 
The ratio of three slaves to five free persons was first proposed in the Congress in 
1783 as part of an overall program for the national government to raise revenue from 
the states.  The ratio was controversial.  Southerners thought it overvalued slaves, and 
northerners thought it undervalued them.  Delegates from Virginia and South Carolina, 
the states with the most slaves, wanted taxation based on land values.  Congress initially 
rejected and then later resurrected the entire package, which called for taxation based 
on population.  Congress then sent the package to the states as an amendment to the 
Articles of Confederation.  However, this amendment failed to achieve the necessary 
unanimous support of all the states, and thus was not added to Articles of 
                                                 
51  For a more complete discussion of Wilson’s position on slavery, see Paul Finkelman, 
Slavery, The Pennsylvania Delegation, and the Peculiar Institution:  The Two Faces of the 
Keystone State, 112 PA. MAG. HIST. AND BIOGRAGPY, 49 (1988). 
52  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 206. 
53  Id. at 205-06. 
54  Id. 
55  SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
69-70 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT]. 
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Confederation.56 
 
This history of the three-fifths clause shows there is little substance to the traditional 
view that the three-fifths clause “was a legacy from the Congress of 1783” or that 
“most northern delegates must have realized even before they arrived in Philadelphia that 
it would be the minimum price of southern acceptance of any new constitution.”  The 
only useful legacy of the Congress of 1783 was the numerical ratio itself, which 
Congress had applied only to taxation.57  The application of the ratio to representation 
was an entirely new concept. 
 
The meaning of the three-fifths clause to the delegates in Philadelphia was clear in 
the report of the Committee of the Whole on June 13, which stated that representation 
would be “in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and 
inhabitants, of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a 
term of years and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing 
description, except Indians, not paying taxes in each State.”58  The phrasing of the term 
“white and other free citizens and inhabitants” clearly implied that the “other persons” 
were neither white nor free.59 By mid-June a majority in the Convention had accepted 
the principle that representation in the national Congress would be based on population 
and that three-fifths of the slave population would be added to the free population in 
determining representation.  However, a minority of the delegates, led by those from 
New Jersey, were still unhappy with this plan. 
 
On June 15 New Jersey delegate William Paterson introduced what is commonly 
known as the New Jersey Plan.  The plan rejected congressional representation based 
on population and, instead, retained the system of representation then in force under the 
Articles of Confederation:  that the states would have an equal number of delegates in 
                                                 
56  The debate over the three-fifths ratio in the Congress is in 25 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 948-952 (Worthington Chauncey Ford et. al., eds. 1922) 
(debates of Mar. 28 - Apr. 1, 1783).  See also 24 id. at 214-216, 223-24. 
57  ROSSITER, supra  note 48, at 173;  DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820 156-158 (1971).  Max Farrand adopted a similar analysis 
arguing that “one finds references in contemporary writings to the ‘Federal ratio,’ as if it were 
well understood what was meant by that term.”  FARRAND, supra  note 48, at 108.  It is 
probably true that many of the delegates at the Convention accepted the ratio of three to five 
as a proper one for determining the value of slaves in society, but this does not mean that 
they agreed the ratio ought to be applied to representation.   
58  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 227. 
59  Id.  The final draft of the Constitution would omit the word “white,” thus leading the 
antislavery radical Lysander Spooner to argue that the “other persons” referred to resident 
aliens.  LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 94 (1845).  Spooner’s 
argument seems more polemical than serious.  Whatever strength it had lay in the ambiguity 
of the wording of the Constitution, which avoided such terms as “slave,” “white,” and 
“black.”   
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the Congress.  For the next fifteen days the Convention debated, without any reference 
to slavery, whether representation in Congress would be based on population.  In most 
of the votes on this issue the South (except Delaware) supported population-based 
representation.  These votes were predicated on the assumption that the three-fifths 
clause, which had already been accepted, would be part of the basis of representation.  
The southern delegates also expected their region to grow faster than the North, and 
thus representation based on population would help them in the long run.  But, even if 
whites did not move south, slaves could still be imported.  Southerners, confident that a 
growing slave population would augment their representation in Congress, consistently 
supported population as the basis of that representation.60 
 
By June 30 the Convention was at a standstill.  The states in favor of population-
based representation had enough votes to adopt their scheme.  But if they were unable 
to persuade the delegates from the smaller states to acquiesce on this point, the 
Convention itself would fail.  In the middle of this debate Madison offered a new mode 
of analysis for the delegates.  He argued: 
 
[t]hat the States were divided into different interests not by their difference of size, 
but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly from climate, 
but principally from (the effects of) their having or not having slaves.  These two 
causes concurred in forming the great division of interests in the U. States.  It did 
not lie between the large and small States: it lay between the Northern and Southern, 
and if any defensive power were necessary, it ought to be mutually given to these 
two interests .61 
 
So Madison proposed two branches of Congress, one in which slaves would be 
counted equally with free people to determine how many representatives each state 
would have, and one in which slaves would not be counted at all.  Under this 
arrangement, “the Southern Scale would have the advantage in one House, and the 
Northern in the other.”62  Madison made this proposal despite his reluctance to “urge 
any diversity of interests on an occasion when it is but too apt to arise of itself. . . .“63 
 
                                                 
60  See generally LYND, supra  note 21, at 185-213.  Gunning Bedford of Delaware observed 
in the debates of June 30 that Georgia, “[t]hough a small State at present,” was “actuated by 
the prospect of soon being a great one.  S. Carolina is actuated both by present interest and 
future prospects.” 1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 491.  North Carolina had “the same motives of 
present and future interest.”  Id. 
61  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 486. 
62  Id. at 487. 
63  Id.  The day before, June 29, Alexander Hamilton had made a similar observation.  
Hamilton, not surprisingly perhaps, saw the issue solely in economic terms.  “The only 
considerable distinction of interests, lay between the carrying and non-carrying States, which 
divide instead of uniting the largest States”  Id. at 466. 
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The Convention ignored Madison’s proposal.  He may have offered it simply to 
divert attention from the heated debate between the large and small states.  If this was 
indeed his goal, he was not immediately successful.  The small states, led by Delaware, 
continued to express fear that they would be swallowed up by larger states if 
representation in the Congress were based solely on population.64 
 
Subsequent debates, however, reveal the validity of Madison’s analysis that 
sectionalism--caused by slavery--was a major cause of division within the Convention 
and the nation.  Indeed, slavery continued to complicate the Convention debates long 
after the division between large and small states had evaporated.  On July 2, Charles 
Pinckney argued that there was “a solid distinction as to interest between the southern 
and northern states.”65  Pinckney noted that the Carolinas and Georgia “in their Rice and 
Indigo had a peculiar interest which might be sacrificed” if they did not have sufficient 
power in any new Congress.66  Immediately after this speech the Convention accepted 
a proposal by General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to send the entire question of 
representation to a committee of one delegate from each state.  The Convention then 
adjourned until July 5. 
 
On July 5 the committee proposed what historians have since called the Great 
Compromise.  Under this plan representation in the lower house of the legislature would 
be based on population, and in the upper house the states would have an equal vote.67  
The three-fifths clause was a part of this proposal. 
 
On July 6 the Convention once again approved the concept of representation based 
on population for the lower house of the Congress.  The Convention then chose a five-
                                                 
64  As if to directly refute Madison’s sectional arguments, Delaware’s Gunning Bedford 
argued that his state had little in common with “South Carolina, puffed up with the 
possession of her wealth and negroes,” or Georgia and North Carolina.  All three states had 
“an eye” on “future wealth and greatness,” which was predicated on slavery, and thus they 
were “united with the great states” against the smaller states like Delaware.  Id. at 500.  
Nevertheless, Delaware would remain a slave state until the adoption of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.  New Jersey, which also opposed representation based on population, might 
also be considered a slave state.  At this time New Jersey had taken no steps to end slavery.  
New Jersey would be the last northern state to pass a gradual emancipation statute, not doing 
so until 1804.  See generally ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE ABOLITION 
OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH (1967).  In the Virginia ratifying convention James Madison 
asserted that New York and New Jersey would “probably, oppose any attempts to annihilate 
this species of property.”  3 DEBATES , supra  note 20, at 459.  However, as William Paterson’s 
subsequent antis lavery statements suggest, the New Jersey delegates were even more 
offended by counting slaves for purposes of representation than they were fearful of popula-
tion-based representation. 
65  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 516. 
66  Id. at 510. 
67  Id. at 526. 
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man committee to redraft the clause.  In the absence of a census this committee would 
also have to recommend to the Convention the number of representatives that each state 
would get in the First Congress.  Before the Convention adjourned for the day, Charles 
Pinckney again raised sectional issues connected to slavery, arguing that “blacks ought 
to stand on an equality with whites,” but he “w[oul]d.... agree to the ratio settled by 
Congs.”68   
 
Pinckney’s argument here was doubly significant.  First, in a debate that had nothing 
to do with slavery per se, Pinckney raised the issue, as if to warn the Convention not to 
forget the special needs of the South.  Second, Pinckney made it clear that he (and 
presumably other southerners) thought that the three-fifths rule for counting slaves was 
a great concession. 
 
On July 9 the committee of five reported its recommendations.  Committee member 
Gouverneur Morris admitted that the allocations in the report were “little more than a 
guess.”69  A number of delegates were dissatisfied with these guesses, because in 
allocating representation for the first congress the committee had taken into account 
“the number of blacks and whites.”70  This action led William Paterson to register a 
protest--only the second so far in the Convention--against the three-fifths clause.  This 
was the beginning of a four-day debate over slavery and representation.  Paterson 
declared he regarded 
 
negroes slaves in no light but as property.  They are no free agents, have 
no personal liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, but on the contrary 
are themselves property, and like other property entirely at the will of the 
Master.71 
 
Paterson pointedly asked, “Has a man in Virga. a number of votes in proportion to the 
number of his slaves?”72  He noted that slaves were not counted in allocating 
representation in southern state legislatures, and asked, “[W]hy should they be 
represented in the Genl. Gov’t[?]”73  Finally, Paterson argued that counting slaves for 
purposes of representation encouraged the slave trade.74 
                                                 
68  Id. at 542. 
69  Id. at 560. 
70  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 559. 
71  Id. at 561. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id.  Paterson’s animosity towards counting slaves is indicated in an analysis of state population, 
reprinted in 1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 572-73.  Paterson tried to estimate the population of each 
state and the numbers of slaves that would augment representation.  For the Deep South he noted, “In 
the lower States the acc[oun]ts are not to be depended on.”  Id. at 572.  Paterson was of course correct 
about the allocation of representation in the slave states.  No slave state at this time based 
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In response, Madison once again proposed that representation in one house of the 
legislature be based on total population and the other on only the free population.  Pierce 
Butler again argued for wealth as a basis for representation.75  This proposal, of course, 
meant that slaves would be counted equally with whites.  Rufus King of Massachusetts 
gave unexpected support to Butler by warning that the South would not unite with the 
rest of the country “unless some respect were paid to their superior wealth.”76  
Furthermore, King reminded his northern colleagues that, if they expected “preferential 
distinctions in Commerce,” they should be willing to give up something.77  At least at 
this point in the Convention, King was willing to accept the three-fifths ratio for 
representation.  Here was the beginning of a major compromise between the deep South 
and the commercially oriented states of the North.  At the moment, King and other 
northerners were offering the three-fifths clause to the South, but the South offered no 
concession in return. 
 
This debate resulted in the appointment of yet another committee to come up with a 
new proposal for representation in the first congress.  This committee reported its 
deliberations the next day, July 10, and the Convention debated them.  Like the previous 
committee, this one had to calculate representation in the First Congress without the 
benefit of a census.  This allocation, which was later written into the Constitution, gave 
the North thirty-five seats in Congress while giving the South 30.78  Not surprisingly, 
some delegates objected to the apportionment for their states.  More important, though, 
was the sectional animosity that these allocations stimulated. 
 
Almost immediately John Rutledge and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South 
Carolina moved to reduce New Hampshire’s representatives from three to two.  
Although on the previous day Rufus King had supported Pierce Butler’s demand for 
more southern representation, he now defended the committee’s apportionment, 
warning that the New England states would not accept any reduction in their 
representation.  King also endorsed Madison’s analysis of sectionalism, arguing that “a 
difference of interests did not lie where it had hitherto been discussed, between the 
great and small States; but between the Southern and Eastern.”79  King nevertheless 
continued to seek compromise and explicitly recognized the need “for the security of 
                                                                                                                         
representation solely on population.  In Virginia, for example, each county had two representative in 
the lower house of the state legislature.  In South Carolina the representatives per parish varied, but the 
allocations were not based on slave population.  In 1808, when South Carolina did go to a population-
based system, the representatives were allocated according to “the whole number of white inhabitants 
in the State.” 
75  Id. at 562. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 563.  See also  U.S. CONSTITUTION, Art. I, § 2, Cl. 3.  
79  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 566. 
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the Southern” interests.80  For this reason he acquiesced to the three-fifths rule and was 
even willing to consider “a still greater security” for the South, although he admitted he 
did not know what that might be.81  But he also asserted that “[n]o principle would 
justify giving” the South “a majority” in Congress.82 
 
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney responded that the South did not require “a majority of 
representatives, but [he] wished them to have something like an equality.”83  Otherwise, 
Congress would pass commercial regulations favorable to the North, and the southern 
states would “be nothing more than overseers for the Northern States.”84  Hugh 
Williamson of North Carolina agreed, arguing that under the present system the North 
would get a majority in Congress which it would never relinquish, and thus “the 
Southn. Interest must be extremely endangered.”85  
 
Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania, who was emerging as the Convention’s most 
vocal opponent of concessions to slavery, became the first delegate to challenge the 
assumption that the South was richer than the North and therefore deserved greater 
representation in Congress.  He also argued that, in time of emergency, northerners 
would have to “spill their blood.”86  Madison’s notes unfortunately do not contain the 
full text of Morris’s statement.  But the implications are clear.  Northerners would have 
to “spill their blood” because there were more free people in the North than in the South 
and because slavery made the South an unreliable ally in wartime. 
 
After various unsuccessful attempts to reduce representation for some northern 
states or increase representation for some southern states, the Convention adopted an 
apportionment scheme for representation in the First Congress by a vote of nine to two. 
 The negative votes did not come from the smallest states, but from the most southern, 
South Carolina and Georgia.87  The delegates from these two states made their point: 
they must have protection for slavery or they would oppose the Constitution. 
 
The next day, July 11, the Convention debated the provision for a census to 
determine future representation in Congress.  Hugh Williamson of North Carolina 
amended the provision under consideration to explicitly include the three-fifths clause 
for counting slaves.  Still dissatisfied with the three-fifths clause, Butler and Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina “insisted that blacks be included in the rule of 
                                                 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 567. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 570. 
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Representation, equally with the Whites,” and moved to delete the three-fifths clause.88 
 Butler argued that “the labour of a slave in S. Carola. was as productive and valuable as 
that of a freeman in Massachusetts,” and since the national government “was instituted 
principally for the protection of property,” slaves should be counted fully for 
representation.89  The Convention quickly rejected the Butler-Pinckney proposal. 
 
The defeat of the Butler-Pinckney resolution did not end the debate over slavery and 
representation.  A motion to require Congress to take a census of all “free inhabitants” 
passed on a slim six-to-four vote, with four slave states voting no.  The Convention 
then began debating the motion to count three-fifths of all slaves.  King and Gorham of 
Massachusetts expressed reservations, and Sherman of Connecticut urged conciliation. 
 
James “ of Pennsylvania, who had initially proposed the three-fifths clause, 
supported it on pragmatic grounds.  Admitting he “did not well see on what principle 
the admission of blacks in the proportion of three fifths could be explained.”90  He 
asked, if slaves were citizens “why are they not admitted on an equality with White 
Citizens?”91  But, if slaves were “admitted as property” it was reasonable to ask, 
“[T]hen why is not other property admitted into the computation?”92  But Wilson 
argued that these logical inconsistencies “must be overruled by the necessity of 
compromise.”93  Gouverneur Morris, also representing Pennsylvania, was not so willing 
to sacrifice principle.  Having been “reduced to the dilemma of doing injustice to the 
Southern States or to human nature,” Morris chose the former, asserting that he “could 
never agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade” by allowing the slave states 
“a representation for their negroes.”94  The three-fifths clause then failed, by a vote of 
four to six.  However, this defeat was not solely the result of Morris’s arguments in 
favor of principle: two slave states opposed the measure as well as three northern 
states.95 
 
The next day, July 12, the three-fifths clause was back on the floor, directly tied to 
taxation for the first time.  The debate was the most divisive yet on slavery.  Six 
southerners, representing Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, addressed the 
                                                 
88  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 580. 
89  Id. at 580-581. 
90  Id. at 587. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 587. 
94  Id. at 588. 
95  Id.  South Carolina apparently opposed the three-fifths clause because the state was 
holding out for full representation for slaves.  Maryland opposed the clause because of its 
current wording.  Thus, even though the three-fifths clause had been defeated, it seemed that 
a majority in favor of it could be found.  Delaware, also a slave state, voted no, but this was 
because that state consistently opposed any representation scheme based on population. 
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issue.  Their collective demand was clear: either give the South substantial 
representation for its slave population, or the South would oppose the Constitution.  
Randolph, who had so far avoided the debates over slavery, “lamented that such a 
species of property existed,” but nevertheless “urged strenuously that express security 
ought to be provided for including slaves in the ratio of Representation.”96  Meanwhile, 
the South Carolinians, as might be expected, demanded full representation for slaves, 
declaring themselves willing, even eager, to be taxed fully for their slaves in return for 
full representation for their slaves.97  William R. Davie of North Carolina, had been 
virtually silent throughout the Convention, now declared “it was high time now to speak 
out.”98  Davie warned that North Carolina would “never confederate” unless slaves 
were counted, at the very least, under a three-fifths ratio.99  Davie threatened that if 
some representation for slaves was not adopted, “the business [of the convention] was 
at an end.”100 
 
Only Gouverneur Morris was prepared to call Davie’s bluff.  Morris warned that 
Pennsylvania would “never agree to a representation of Negroes,” but he also agreed 
that it was “vain for the Eastern states to insist on what the Southn States will never 
agree to.”101  As much as Morris wished “to form a compact for the good of America,” 
he seemed ready to risk failure on the issue of slave representation.102  Although no 
other northern delegate was willing to join Morris on this issue, Oliver Ellsworth and 
William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut strongly supported southern interests, 
foreshadowing an emerging compromise between New England and the South over 
slavery and commerce.  After a heated debate, the Convention finally adopted the three-
fifths clause by a vote of six to two, with two states divided.103 
 
After more than a month and a half of anguished argument, the Convention had 
finally resolved the issue of representation for what would become the House of 
Representatives.  Throughout, slavery had constantly confused the issue and thwarted 
compromise.  Sectional interests caused by slavery had emerged as a major threat to the 
Union.  At this juncture in the Convention the smaller states still feared the larger ones; 
                                                 
96  Id. at 594. 
97  Id. 
98  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 593. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 597.  The two divided delegations were Massachusetts 
and South Carolina.  In the former delegation some members apparently opposed this 
concession to the South.  In the latter, some members apparently were holding out for full 
representation for slaves.  In this debate Pierce Butler had argued for full representation for 
blacks.  Id. at 592.  The two negative votes came from Delaware and New Jersey, states which 
had consistently opposed population-based representation. 
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however, the northern and southern states had also come to openly distrust each other. 
 In the last debate over representation, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney declared 
he was “alarmed” over statements about slavery by northern delegates.104  His alarm 
would soon spread to other southern delegates. 
 
No sooner had the Convention laid to rest the issue of representation than it re-
emerged as part of the debate over taxation.  On July 13 Elbridge Gerry proposed that, 
until an actual census could be taken, taxation would be based on the initial 
representation in the House.  This seemingly reasonable proposal set the stage for a 
partial reopening of the debate over representation. 
 
Reviving an earlier proposal, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina tried to cut New 
Hampshire’s representation in the House of Representatives from three to two.  
Williamson argued that because New Hampshire had not yet sent any delegates to the 
Convention, it was unfair to force the state to pay taxes on the basis of three 
representatives.  This explanation fooled no one, and Williamson’s maneuver failed.  
Next, Read of Delaware expressed the fear that Gerry’s motion was a plot by the larger 
states to tax the smaller ones.  This led Madison to reiterate his belief that “the 
difference of interest in the U. States lay not between the large and small, but the N. and 
Southn. States.”105  Madison supported Gerry’s motion “because it tended to moderate 
the views both of the opponents and advocates for rating very high, the negroes.”  
After three votes Gerry’s motion passed.  The Convention had deepened its 
commitment to the three-fifths clause, both for representation and for taxation.106 
 
With the sense of the Convention on this issue apparently clear, Randolph moved to 
bring language previously used in the working document into conformity with the three-
fifths clause.  Earlier in the Convention the body declared that representation would be 
based on “wealth.”  Randolph now proposed substituting the wording of the three-fifths 
clause for the word “wealth.”107   This opened the way for yet one more debate over 
the three-fifths clause.  This debate revealed the deep animosities that had developed 
between some northern and southern delegates. 
 
Gouverneur Morris began by mocking the attempt to replace the word “wealth” with 
the three-fifths clause.  If slaves were “property,” then “the word wealth was right, and 
striking it out would produce the very inconsistency which it was meant to get rid 
                                                 
104  Id. 
105  Id. at 601. 
106  Id. at 602.  Gouverneur Morris would later argue that the application of the three-fifths 
clause to direct taxes was inserted “as a bridge to assist” the Convention “over a certain 
gulph” caused by slavery.  Once the Convention had passed this point, Morris was ready to 
abandon direct taxation based on the three-fifths clause.  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 106. 
107  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 603. 
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of.”108  Morris then launched into a full scale attack on southern demands.  In the 
process he suggested that a peaceful end to the Convention, and the Union itself, might 
be in order.  Morris asserted that, until this point in the Convention, he had believed that 
the distinction between northern and southern states was “heretical.”109  Somewhat 
disingenuously, he declared that he “still thought the [sectional] distinction 
groundless.”110  But he saw that it was “persisted in; and that the Southn. Gentleman 
will not be satisfied unless they see the way open to their gaining a majority in the public 
Councils.”111  The North naturally demanded “some defence” against this.  Morris thus 
concluded: 
 
[E]ither this distinction is fictitious or real: if fictitious let it be dismissed and let us 
proceed with due confidence.  If it be real, instead of attempting to blend 
incompatible things, let us at once take a friendly leave of each other.  There can be 
no end of demands for security if every particular interest is to be entitled to it .112 
 
Morris argued that the North had as much to fear from the South as the South had to 
fear from the North.113 
 
South Carolina’s Pierce Butler responded with equal candor: “The security the 
Southn. States want is that their negroes may not be taken from them which some 
gentlemen within or without doors, have a very good mind to do.”114  For the rest of 
the Convention Butler and his southern colleagues would remain vigilant in protecting 
this interest. 
 
By Saturday the fourteenth, sectional tempers had cooled.  The Convention now 
reconsidered the makeup of what would ultimately become the Senate.  The small states 
again reiterated their fears that the large states would overwhelm them in a legislature 
based entirely on population.  Delegates from New Jersey and Connecticut made it clear 
that they would not support the emerging Constitution unless there was state equality in 
at least one branch of the legislature.  Charles Pinckney once again proposed that 
representation in both houses of the legislature be based on population.  In supporting 
this motion Madison yet again argued that “the real difference of interests lay, not 
between the large and small but between the N. and Southn. States.  The institution of 
slavery and its consequences formed the line of discrimination.”115  Madison seemed 
particularly worried that state equality would give the North a perpetual majority in one 
                                                 
108  Id. at 604. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
112  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 604. 
113  Id. at 603-604. 
114  Id. at 605. 
115  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 10. 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/1
1999] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE MASTER CLASS 
branch of the legislature.116 
 
Over Madison’s protests, the equality of the states in the Senate remained part of the 
Constitution.  On the final vote on this issue, three of the four negative votes came from 
the South.117  This vote indicates that Madison’s sense of sectional division was at least 
as important as the division between large and small states. 
 
On July 16, when debate resumed over the powers of Congress, Butler and Rutledge 
opposed giving Congress the power to legislate where the states were “incompetent.”118 
 The southerners feared this “vague” and, therefore, dangerous power, and thus four 
slave states supported a futile attempt to recommit this clause.119  This debate illustrates 
that sectional fears, more than rivalries between large and small states, had emerged as 
the major problem for the Convention.  Butler and Rutledge, after all, were fearful of 
what a Congress dominated by the North might do.  Any vagueness in language might 
be used to harm slavery.120 
 
The irony of the shifting sentiments of the Carolinians became clearer a day later, 
when Gunning Bedford offered compromise language for this clause.  Bedford, of 
Delaware, had up to this time vociferously represented the needs, and fears, of the 
small states.  During the debates over representation he had emphatically told his fellow 
delegates, “I do not gentlemen, trust you.”121  Bedford was probably as jealous of state 
power, and as fearful of national power, as any man at the Convention.  Yet, on this 
issue he was not fearful and was willing to compromise, because even he saw nothing 
dangerous in the proposed clause, especially if it contained his compromise language.  
Bedford’s amendment did not mollify the delegates from South Carolina and Georgia, 
however, who remained opposed to allowing the national government to legislate for the 
“general interest of the Union.”122  These Deep South delegates no doubt suspected that 
such language might somehow be used to harm slavery.  Legislating for the “general 
interest” of the Union, they feared, might some day threaten the particular interest of 
slavery. 
 
IV.  SLAVERY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
 
                                                 
116  Id. at 9-10. 
117  Id. at 13.  The negative votes were from Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Pennsylvania.  Id. at 15. 
118  Id. at 17. 
119  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 17. 
120  Id.  The recommittal vote ended in a tie (and thus lost).  The only northern state to vote 
for it was Connecticut, which almost always voted with the Deep South on issues concerning 
slavery.  The only Deep South state to oppose the recommittal was North Carolina.  Id. 
121  1 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 500. 
122  2 id. at 27. 
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The Convention was deeply divided over how the nation’s chief executive should be 
chosen.  Slavery complicated the debates on this questions and partially affected their 
outcome.  On July 17 the Convention considered, and rejected by wide margins, 
election by the Congress, direct election by the people, and election by the state 
legislatures.  Significantly, the most vocal opposition to election by the people came 
from three southerners:  Charles Pinckney, George Mason, and Hugh Williamson.  
While Pinckney and Mason argued against the competence of the “people,”123  
Williamson was more open about the reasons for southern opposition.  He noted 
Virginia would not be able to elect her leaders president because “[h]er slaves will have 
no suffrage.”124  The same of course would be true for the rest of the South. 
 
For James Madison the debate over the presidency was particularly difficult.  
Because he believed that “concepts of right and justice were paramount expressions of 
majority rule,”125 Madison instinctively favored election of the president by the people.  
He told the Convention that “the people at large” were “the fittest” to choose the 
president.126  But “one difficulty . . . of a serious nature” made election by the people 
impossible.127  Madison noted that the “right of suffrage was much more diffusive in 
the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the 
election on the score of the Negroes.”128  In order to guarantee that the nonvoting 
slaves could nevertheless influence the presidential election, Madison favored the 
creation of the electoral college.129   Under this system each state was given a number 
of electors equal to its total congressional and senatorial representation.  This meant that 
the three-fifths clause would help determine the outcome of presidential elections.130  
                                                 
123  Id. at 30-31. 
124  Id. at 32.  Roger Sherman, who virtually always voted with the South on important 
matters, also opposed direct election of the president.  Id. at 29. 
125  RALPH KETCHAM, JAMES MADISON: A BIOGRAPHY 181 (1971).  Madison did not have 
unlimited faith in the people, as his essay “Vices of the Political System of the United States” 
indicates and indeed, he had some sympathies for the indirect election of officials because 
such a system limited the power of the people.  Id. at 186-189.  However, this is not the 
position he took in the Convention, where he argued for the theoretical value of direct 
election, but in the end opposed it, at least in part because of slavery.  2 RECORDS, supra note 
16, at 56-57. 
126  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 56. 
127  Id. at 57. 
128  Id. 
129  Id.  The acceptance of the electoral college based on the House of Representatives 
took place on July 20, the day after Madison’s speech.  Id. at 64.  On July 25 the Convention 
reconsidered this vote.  Once again Madison argued that the North would have an advantage 
in a popular election, although here Madison did not specifically mention slavery.  2 
RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 111. 
130  Ironically, this antidemocratic system which Madison ultimately supported 
subsequently had a major impact on his career.  Thomas Jefferson’s victory in the election of 
1800, and Madison’s elevation to the position of secretary of state and heir apparent, would 
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Thus, the fundamentally antidemocratic electoral college developed, at least in part, to 
protect the interests of slavery. 
 
V.  COMMERCE AND SLAVERY:  THE DIRTY COMPROMISE 
 
By late July, the Convention had hammered out the basic outline of the Constitution. 
 On July 23 the Convention agreed to send the draft of the Constitution to a Committee 
of Detail.  At this juncture General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney “reminded the 
Convention that if the Committee should fail to insert some security to the Southern 
States agst. an emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, he shd. be bound by duty 
to his State to vote agst. their Report.”131  This protest must have surprised the 
Convention.  In the previous nine days the subject of slavery had not been directly 
debated; and where it had come up at all, such as in the discussion of the election of the 
president, the South had had its way.  Now, just as the work of many weeks was about 
to go to a committee for what many hoped was a final redrafting, Pinckney raised new 
demands for the protection for slavery. 
 
Pinckney’s outburst provoked no immediate reaction.  The Convention remained in 
session for three more days, redebating how the executive should be chosen and 
numerous minor details.  Finally, on July 26 the Convention adjourned until August 6, to 
allow the Committee of Detail to put the Convention’s work into some coherent form.  
This five-man committee included two southerners, Rutledge and Randolph, while a 
third member, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, came from a state which had 
consistently supported southern interests in the Convention. 
 
The report of the Committee of Detail contained a number of provisions aimed at the 
protection of slavery.132  The new Congress could not interfere with the African slave 
trade and would need a two-thirds majority to pass navigation acts.133  The new 
government would be obligated to provide military support to suppress rebellions and 
insurrections in the states.134  Although Clause IV provided for representation based on 
                                                                                                                         
be possible only because of the electoral votes the southern states gained on account of their 
slaves.  LYND, supra  note 21, at 178.  Many northerners believed the outcome of the 1812 
election would have been different if it were not for the three-fifths clause, although this is 
probably not the case.  However, without the three-fifths clause John Quincy Adams might 
have had more electoral votes than Andrew Jackson and might have been elected outright in 
1824.  ROBINSON, supra  note 57, at 405. 
131  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 95. 
132  Id. at 177-189.  In the reproduced version, all references to numbered sections are to 
those of the printed report.  That report goes up to Art. XXII because there are two articles 
numbered VI. 
133  Id. at 183. 
134  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 182. 
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“the number of inhabitants, according to the provisions herein after made,”135 no such 
provisions were in fact in this draft.  Thus, the committee report implied that the slaves 
would be counted equally with all other “inhabitants” when determining representation 
in Congress.  The three-fifths clause was in the Committee report, but applied only to 
“direct” taxes and “capitation” taxes, and not to representation.136  The committee 
report also prohibited taxation of both exports and imported slaves.137  With the 
exception of a clause allowing Congress to regulate commerce by a simple majority,138 
the draft Constitution seemed to give the South everything it wanted.  The Committee 
of Detail appeared to have taken to heart Pinckney’s demand for “some security to the 
Southern States.”139 
 
On August 7 the Convention began to debate the committee report.  On the next day 
yet another debate over the three-fifths clause took place.  Hugh Williamson moved to 
clarify the status of this clause by replacing the phrase “the provisions herein after 
made” with a direct reference to the three-fifths provision.140  After the Convention 
adopted Williamson’s motion, Rufus King protested that counting slaves for 
representation “was a most grating circumstance,” especially because the draft of the 
Constitution also prohibited Congress from banning the slave trade or even taxing the 
produce of slave labor.141  He thought that some provision ought to be made for ending 
the slave trade, but at minimum he argued that “either slaves should not be represented, 
or exports should be taxable.”142 
 
Roger Sherman, who would prove to be one of the Deep South’s most vocal 
northern ally,143 agreed with King that the slave trade was “iniquitous” but believed that 
this issue should not be raised in connection with the question of representation, which 
had “been [s]ettled after much difficulty and deliberation.”144  Madison, Ellsworth, and 
Sherman then tried to discuss other topics, but Gouverneur Morris would not let the 
slavery issue drop.  He moved to insert the word “free” in front of the word 
“inhabitants” in the clause directing how representation would be determined.  Believing 
                                                 
135  Id. at 178. 
136  Id. at 182-83. 
137  Id. at 183. 
138  Id. at 181. 
139  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 95. 
140  Id. at 219. 
141  Id. at 220. 
142  Id. 
143  Ironically, Sherman's grandson, Roger Sherman Baldwin, would be the lead attorney in 
United States v. Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841), which was one of the few antislavery 
victories in the U.S. Supreme Court in the antebellum period.  See generally HOWARD JONES, 
MUTINY ON THE AMISTAD: THE SAGA OF A SLAVE REVOLT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICAN 
ABOLITION, LAW, AND DIPLOMACY (1987). 
144  Id. at 220-21. 
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that “[m]uch. . . would depend on this point,” Morris said that he could “never . . . 
concur in upholding domestic slavery,” which was “the curse of heaven on the States 
where it prevailed.”145  Morris compared the “rich and noble cultivation” of the middle 
states with “the misery and poverty which overspread the barren wastes of Va., Maryd. 
and the other states having slaves” and concluded that counting slaves for 
representation 
 
when fairly explained comes to this:  that the inhabitant of Georgia and S.C. who 
goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity 
tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest connections and dam[n]s them to 
the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in a Govt. instituted for protection 
of the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of Pa. or N. Jersey who views with a 
laudable horror, so nefarious a practice.146 
 
According to Morris, the draft Constitution compelled the North “to march their militia 
for the defense of the S. States; for their defense agst. those very slaves of whom they 
complain.”147  Furthermore, the government lacked the power to levy a tax on imported 
slaves or on the goods they produced.  Worst of all, counting slaves for representation 
encouraged the South to import more of them.  Morris scoffed at the idea that there 
could ever be a direct tax, such as the three-fifths clause allowed, because it was “idle 
to suppose that the Genl. Govt. can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the 
people scattered over so vast a Country.”148  Thus the South would get extra 
representation in Congress for its slaves and have to pay nothing in return.  Morris 
declared he “would sooner submit himself to a tax for paying for all the Negroes in the 
U. States than saddle posterity with such a Constitution.”149 
 
For the first time in the Convention, two northerners--King and Morris--had 
denounced slavery in the same debate.  A third, Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, joined 
them by seconding Morris’s motion.  Curiously, no one responded in kind to these 
attacks.  Roger Sherman calmly answered his northern neighbors, declaring he saw no 
“insuperable objections” to “the admission of the Negroes into the ratio of 
representation.”150  He argued “It was the freemen of the Southn. States who were in 
fact to be represented according to the taxes paid by them, and the Negroes are only 
included in the Estimate of the taxes.”151  This response reflected claims made by 
delegates from South Carolina since the beginning of the Convention, that wealth as 
well as population had to be represented in the Congress.  James Wilson added that the 
                                                 
145  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 221. 
146  Id. at 221-22. 
147  Id. at 222. 
148  Id. at 223. 
149  Id. at 223. 
150  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 223. 
151  Id. 
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objections by Morris and King were premature.  Charles Pinckney merely indicated that 
he would reply “if the occasion were a proper one.”152  The Convention then 
overwhelmingly rejected Morris’s amendment.153   
 
For the South this debate, along with the vote that followed it, was a major victory.  
The debate exposed many of the weaknesses of slavery; some delegates had made 
powerful moral and practical arguments against the institution.  Yet, all the northern 
states except New Jersey voted with the South. 
 
In the following week the Convention managed to avoid rancorous debates over 
slavery, even though sectional distrust sometimes appeared.154  This period of calm 
ended on August 16, when the Convention began another debate over the powers of 
Congress.  During a routine discussion of the power of Congress to levy taxes and 
duties, George Mason raised the issue of the power of Congress to tax exports.  A part 
of the draft Constitution that had not yet been debated specifically prohibited Congress 
from taxing exports.  Mason wanted to debate the issue out of order.  He did not want 
to give Congress the right to levy any tax without simultaneously adopting a 
corresponding prohibition on export taxes.  Mason “was unwilling to trust to its being 
done in a future article” and “professed his jealousy for the productions of the Southern 
or as he called them, the staple States.”155  Sherman and Rutledge quickly reassured 
Mason that such a provision could be dealt with later.  Mason could not, however, have 
been totally reassured when Gouverneur Morris declared that a prohibition on taxing 
exports was “radically objectionable.”156  A number of other delegates then debated this 
issue.  With the exception of Madison, all the southerners opposed taxing exports; all of 
the northerners, except those from Connecticut and Massachusetts, favored the idea.157 
 The Convention then postponed the question of taxing exports.  
 
This short debate gave hints of a developing bargain between New Englanders and 
delegates from the Deep South.  In reassuring Mason, South Carolina’s John Rutledge 
noted that he would vote for the commerce clause as it stood, but only “on condition 
                                                 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
154  For example, North Carolina’s Richard Spaight expressed fear that the capital would 
always remain in New York City, “especially if the Presidt. should be a Northern Man.”  Id. at 
261.  In debates over qualifications for officeholding, clear sectional differences emerged.  
Southerners usually favored property qualifications and strict residency, or even nativity 
qualifications.  Northerners did not.  See id. at 248-49, 267-72.  Ellsworth of Connecticut 
argued that a meaningful property qualification in the South would preclude almost all 
northerners from holding office, and a fair qualification in the North would be meaningless in 
the South, where the delegates presumed there was more wealth.  Id. at 249. 
155  Id. at 305-06. 
156  Id. at 306. 
157  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 306-08. 
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that the subsequent part relating to negroes should also be agreed to.”158  Rutledge 
clearly equated an export tax with an attack on slavery.  Delegates from Connecticut 
and Massachusetts indicated some support for Rutledge’s position.  What should be 
called the “dirty compromise” of the Convention was taking shape.  The South Carolina 
delegation would support the commerce clause if New England would support prohibi-
tion on export taxes and protection for the slave trade.  This understanding solidified 
during the next two weeks. 
 
On August 21, the New England states joined the five slave states south of Delaware 
on three crucial votes.  On the first vote all three New England states voted to defeat an 
amendment to the draft Constitution that would have allowed Congress, by a simple 
majority vote, to tax exports in order to raise money to support the national 
government.159  During the debate over this motion, Connecticut’s Ellsworth argued 
against taxing exports because such taxes would unfairly hurt the South which 
produced major export crops such as “Tobo. rice and indigo.”160  Ellsworth believed “a 
tax on these alone would be partial and unjust.”161  Next, in a key five-to-six vote 
Connecticut joined the five slave states to defeat a proposal, made by James Madison, 
to allow taxes on exports by a two-thirds vote of Congress.162  On the final vote, to 
absolutely ban all export taxes, Massachusetts joined Connecticut, and the measure to 
prohibit export taxes, favored by the South, passed seven to four.163  During the debate 
the Virginia delegation was divided, three to two, with James Madison and George 
Washington unsuccessfully favoring Congressional power to tax exports.164 
 
The Convention then debated a motion by Luther Martin to allow an import tax on 
slaves.  Martin represented Maryland, a slave state, but one with a surplus of slaves, a 
fact that helps explain his opposition to the African trade.  Rutledge opposed Martin’s 
motion with a two-pronged attack.  He first told the Convention that the “true question 
at present is whether the Southn. States shall or shall not be parties to the Union.”165  
The implied threat of secession was clear.  He then told the northern delegates that, if 
they would “consult their interest,” they would “not oppose the increase of [s]laves 
which will increase the commodities of which they will become the carriers.”166  
Ellsworth of Connecticut agreed, refusing to debate the “morality or wisdom of 
slavery” and simply asserting that “[w]hat enriches a part enriches the whole.”167  The 
                                                 
158  Id. at 306. 
159  Id. at 363. 
160  Id. at 360. 
161  Id. 
162  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 363. 
163  Id. at 363. 
164  Id. at 363-64. 
165  Id. at 364. 
166  Id. 
167  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 364. 
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alliance for profit between the Deep South and New England was now fully developed. 
 Charles Pinckney then reaffirmed that South Carolina would “never receive the plan if 
it prohibits the slave trade.”168  Shrewdly, Pinckney equated a tax on imported slaves 
with a prohibition on the trade itself.  On this note the Convention retired for the day. 
 
Roger Sherman opened debate the next day by adopting a familiar pose.  He declared 
his personal disapproval of slavery but refused to condemn it in other parts of the 
nation.  He then argued against a prohibition of the slave trade.  First, he asserted that 
“the public good did not require” an end to the trade.169  Noting that the states already 
had the right to import slaves, Sherman saw no point in taking a right away from the 
states unnecessarily because “it was expedient to have as few objections as possible” to 
the new Constitution.170  Here Sherman assumed it was necessary to defuse southern 
opposition to the Constitution, which might result from a ban on the slave trade, but he 
did not think it necessary to placate those who might oppose the Constitution if it 
allowed the slave trade to continue.  Sherman was prepared to appease those who 
supported the slave trade, but he apparently was unconcerned about the strong 
opposition to the slave trade in his own region.  Next, Sherman observed that “the 
abolition of slavery seemed to be going on in the U.S.”171  If left alone, the “good sense 
of the several States” would soon put an end to all slavery in the country.172  In making 
this argument Sherman either confused the abolition of the slave trade with the abolition 
of slavery itself, or he foolishly believed that because New England and Pennsylvania 
had begun to abolish slavery, the rest of the nation would soon follow.  Finally, 
revealing his priorities, Sherman urged the delegates to hurry and finish their business, 
noting, no doubt, that they had been in session for almost three months.173  
 
George Mason of Virginia responded to Sherman with a fierce attack on the “infernal 
trafic[sic]” in slaves, which he blamed on “the avarice of British Merchants.”174  
                                                 
168  Id. 
169  Id. at 369. 
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 370. 
173  Id.  During the ratification process proponents of the Constitution would similarly 
confuse the power to end “the slave trade” after 1808, which Congress had, with 
congressional power to end the slavery itself, which Congress clearly did not have.  James 
Wilson, for example, told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that after “the lapse of a few 
years . . . . Congress will have power to exterminate slavery from within our borders.”  2 
DEBATES , supra  note 20, at 484.  Since Wilson attended all the debates over this clause, it is 
impossible to accept this statement as his understanding of the slave trade clause.  More 
likely, he simply made this argument to win support for the Constitution.  In New Hampshire a 
supporter of the Constitution also argued that the slave trade clause gave Congress the 
power to end slavery.  He was quickly disabused of this notion by Joshua Atherton.  Id. at 
203. 
174  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 370. 
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Reflecting the sectional hostilities at the Convention, as well as trying to lay blame on 
anyone but Virginians for the problem of slavery, Mason then “lamented” that his 
“Eastern brethren had from a lust of gain embarked in this nefarious traffic.”175  Mason 
leveled some of the strongest criticism of slavery yet heard at the Convention, declaring 
it an “evil” system which produced “the most pernicious effect on manners.”176  He 
declared that “[e]very master of slaves is born a petty tyrant” and warned that slavery 
would “bring the judgment of heaven on a Country” and ultimately produce “national 
calamities.”177  Despite this apparent attack on the whole institution, Mason ended his 
speech by demanding only that the national government “have power to prevent the 
increase of slavery” by prohibiting the African trade.178  As Peter Wallenstein has 
argued, “Whatever his occasional rhetoric, George Mason was--if one must choose--
proslavery, not antislavery.  He acted in behalf of Virginia slaveholders, not Virginia 
slaves,” when he opposed a continuation of the African trade.179  
 
Others at the Convention understood this quite well.  Mason failed to say that 
Virginia, like Maryland, had a surplus of slaves and did not need the African slave trade 
any longer.  But James McHenry candidly wrote in his private notes:  “That the 
population or increase of slaves in Virginia exceeded their calls for their services,” and 
thus a prohibition of the slave trade “would be a monopoly” in Virginia’s “favor.”180  
Under such conditions “Virginia etc would make their own terms for such [slaves] as 
they might sell.”181  The “etc” no doubt included McHenry’s own state of Maryland. 
 
Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, adopting the same pose as Sherman, answered 
Mason.  Because “he had never owned a slave,” Ellsworth declared he “could not judge 
of the effects of slavery on character.”182  However, if slavery were as wrong as 
Mason had suggested, merely ending the trade was insufficient.  Ellsworth, of course, 
knew that the Virginians opposed allowing the national government to abolish slavery.  
Therefore, since there were many slaves in Virginia and Maryland and fewer in the 
Deep South, any prohibition on the trade would be “unjust towards S. Carolina and 
Georgia.”183  So Ellsworth urged the Convention not to “intermeddle” in the affairs of 
other states.184  The Convention had now witnessed the unusual phenomenon of a New 
                                                 
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  Peter Wallenstein, Flawed Keepers of the Flame:  The Interpreters of George Mason, 
102 VA. MAG. HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 229, 253 (1994).  This article describes scholarly and 
popular misunderstandings of Mason’s views on slavery. 
180  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 378. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. at 370-71. 
183  Id. at 371. 
184  Id. 
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Englander defending the slave trade against the attacks of a Virginian. 
 
The Carolinians were of course quite capable of defending their own institution.  
Charles Pinckney, citing ancient Rome and Greece, declared that slavery was “justified 
by the example of all the world.”185  He warned that any prohibition of the slave trade 
would “produce serious objections to the Constitution which he wished to see 
adopted.”186  His cousin, General Pinckney, also declared his support for the 
Constitution, but noted that his “personal influence . . . would be of no avail towards 
obtaining the assent” of his home state.187  He believed Virginia’s opposition to the trade 
was more pecuniary than moral.  Virginia would “gain by stopping the importations” 
because “[h]er slaves will rise in value, and she has more than she wants.”188  
Prohibiting the trade would force South Carolina and Georgia “to confederate” on 
“unequal terms.”189  While Virginia might gain, the nation as a whole would not.  More 
slaves would produce more goods, and that result would help not only the South but 
also states involved in “the carrying trade.”190  Seeing the slave trade solely as an 
economic issue, Pinckney thought it “reasonable” that imported slaves be taxed.191  But 
a prohibition of the slave trade would be “an exclusion of S. Carola from the Union.”192 
 As he had made clear at the beginning of his speech, “S. Carolina and Georgia cannot 
do without slaves.”193  Rutledge and Butler added similar sentiments, as did Abraham 
Baldwin of Georgia and Williamson of North Carolina.194 
 
New England accents now supported the Southern drawls.  Gerry of Massachusetts 
offered some conciliatory remarks, and Sherman, ever the ally of the South, declared 
that “it was better to let the S. States import slaves than to part with them, if they made 
that a sine qua non.”195  However, in what may have been an attempt to give his 
remarks an antislavery tone, he argued that taxing imported slaves was morally wrong, 
because that “implied they were property.”196  This position undoubtedly pleased 
Sherman’s southern allies, who did not want to pay taxes on any slaves they imported.  
Sherman’s speech also underscored the profound support that the Carolinians and 
Georgians found among some New Englanders. 
 
                                                 
185  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 371. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. 
188  Id. 
189  Id. 
190  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 371. 
191  Id. at 371-72. 
192  Id. at 372. 
193  Id. at 371. 
194  Id. at 372-74. 
195  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 374. 
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The reasons for cooperation between New England and the Deep South on this issue 
were now clear.  New Englanders, involved in the “carrying trade,” would profit from 
transporting rice and other products produced by slave labor.  And the South 
Carolinians seemed willing to support the New Englanders’ demands for Congressional 
power to regulate all commerce.  In return, New Englanders would support the right of 
the Carolinas and Georgia to import the slaves they could not “do without.” 
 
On the other side of the issue only John Langdon of New Hampshire and John 
Dickinson of Delaware vigorously opposed allowing the slave trade to continue.  
Dickinson argued that the trade was “inadmissible on every principle of honor and 
safety.”197  Furthermore, he was prepared to call the Carolinians’ bluff on the question 
of Union, doubting the Deep South would reject the Constitution if the trade were 
prohibited.  James Wilson was also skeptical of southern threats, but he did not offer 
any strong rebuttal.  Nor did Rufus King, who only pointed out that prohibiting a tax on 
imported Africans was an “inequality that could not fail to strike the commercial 
sagacity of the Northern and middle States.”198 
 
The most surprising contribution to this debate came from Gouverneur Morris of 
Pennsylvania, who had previously been the most consistent opponent of slavery at the 
Convention.  He suggested that the subject of commercial regulation acts and the slave 
trade be sent to committee.  “These things may form a bargain among the Northern and 
Southern States,” he shrewdly noted.  The Convention quickly accepted his 
suggestion.199  
 
Two days later, on August 25, the committee reported a compromise proposal; on 
the twenty-sixth the Convention began to debate it.  The committee proposed that 
Congress be barred from prohibiting the African slave trade until 1800, but that in the 
meantime a reasonable tax could be levied on imported slaves.200  General Charles C. 
Pinckney immediately urged that the date be changed to 1808,201 which would be 
twenty years after the Constitution was ratified.  Gorham of Massachusetts seconded 
this motion.  Madison complained that this provision was “dishonorable to the National 
                                                 
197  Id. at 372. 
198  Id. at 373.  Wilson’s position here must be contrasted with the position he took in the 
state ratifying convention.  See supra  text accompanying notes 90-91.  Nathaniel Gorham of 
Massachusetts also registered his opposition to the slave trade, but only after the issue was 
recommitted. 
199  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 374.  McHenry’s notes on this debate are quite revealing. 
 Although not attributing remarks to any particular delegate, McHenry’s notes make clear that 
part of the conflict between Virginia and the deep South on the issue was economic.  Virginia 
had surplus slaves to sell, and the value of those slaves would be undermined by the African 
trade.  Id. at 378. 
200  Id. at 396. 
201  Id. at 415. 
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character” and to the Constitution and the “[t]wenty years will produce all the mischief 
that can be apprehended from the liberty to import slaves.”202  Nevertheless, the 
delegates accepted Pinckney’s change by a seven-to-four vote.  Three New England 
states, Maryland, and the three Deep South states supported Pinckney’s motion.203 
 
Gouverneur Morris, still resisting a continuation of the slave trade, then proposed 
that the clause specifically declare that the “importation of slaves” be limited to the 
Carolinas and Georgia.  Morris wanted it known “that this part of the Constitution was 
a compliance with those States.”204  Having made this motion only to embarrass 
supporters of the trade, Morris withdrew it.  By a seven-to-four vote the Convention 
then adopted the slave trade provision.  The three New England states once again joined 
Maryland and the Deep South to allow the slave trade to continue for twenty years.205  
This vote formed a key component of the “dirty compromise.” 
 
On August 28 the Convention debated what would become the privileges and 
immunities clause of the Constitution.  Charles Cotesworth Pinckney “seemed to wish 
some provision should be included in favor of property in slaves,” but he did not press 
the point, and the Convention accepted the clause with only South Carolina voting 
no.206  Pinckney’s concern was apparently over the right of masters to travel from state 
to state with their slaves.  In fact, those states which had already passed gradual 
emancipation statues, like Pennsylvania, had made provisions for slave transit.  Perhaps 
for this reason, other southern delegates did not share Pinckney’s concern.  This seems 
to have been the only time during the Convention when southerners perceived a threat 
to slavery, but were unable to muster the votes, or perhaps their own energies, to head 
                                                 
202  Id. at 415. 
203  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 415. 
204  Id. 
205  Id. at 416.  The Convention then changed the wording of the tax provision of the 
clause, limiting the tax on slaves to ten dollars.  Id. at 417.  Walter Berns argues that the term 
“migration” in the slave trade clause referred to the interstate slave trade, and that the term 
“importation” referred to the African slave trade.  Walter Berns, The Constitution and the 
Migration of Slaves, 78 YALE L.J. 198 (1968).  If this analysis were correct, then it would 
appear that the delegates from the Deep South were willing to allow Congress to prohibit the 
domestic slave trade as well as the African slave trade after 1808.  This analysis defies all 
understanding of the Convention.  Berns, moreover, provides no evidence that anyone at the 
Constitutional Convention or in any of the state ratifying conventions believed this.  As 
William Wiecek more accurately argues, the term “migration” was “potentially a weapon in 
the hands of moderate abolitionists” of the mid-nineteenth century.  SOURCES, supra  note 7, 
at 75.  But certainly no one in the Convention saw it that way.  More importantly, in the 
nineteenth century only a few radical opponents of slavery thought the clause could be used 
this way.  At no time before 1861 did any President, leader of Congress, or a majority in either 
house of Congress accept this analysis.  
206  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 443. 
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it off.207 
 
The Convention immediately turned to the fugitives from justice clause.  Butler and 
Charles Pinckney attempted to amend this provision “ ‘to require fugitive slaves and 
servants to be delivered up like criminals.’ ”208  Roger Sherman sarcastically countered 
that he “saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant, 
than a horse.”209  James Wilson objected that this would cost the free states money.  
Significantly, this opposition came from two delegates who usually sided with the 
South.  Butler wisely “withdrew his proposition in order that some particular provision 
might be made apart from this article.”210 
 
The next day, the debates over commerce, the slave trade, and fugitive slaves were 
all joined to complete the “dirty compromise.”  In a debate over the commerce clause 
Charles Pinckney, the younger and more impetuous of the two cousins, moved that a 
two-thirds majority be required for all commercial regulations.  He argued that “[t]he 
power of regulating commerce was a pure concession on the part of the S. States” and 
that therefore the two-thirds requirement was reasonable.211 
 
General C. C. Pinckney agreed that “it was the true interest of the S. States to have 
no regulation of commerce.”212  But, in one of the most revealing statements of the 
Convention, he explained his support for a clause requiring only a simple majority for 
passage of commercial legislation.  Pinckney said he took this position because of “their 
[‘the Eastern states’] liberal conduct towards the views of South Carolina.”213  The 
“views of South Carolina” concerned the slave trade.  In the margins of his notes 
Madison made this clear.  Madison wrote that Pinckney 
                                                 
207  Id.  See generally PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:  SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND 
COMITY (1981). 
208  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 443. 
209  Id. 
210  Id.  James Hutson has found a draft of the fugitive slave clause in the Pierce Butler 
papers that is not in Butler’s handwriting and concluded that this unknown “author would 
seem to challenge Butler for the dubious honor of being the father of the fugitive slave 
clause.” Pierce Butler’s Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention, 37 THE Q.J. LIBR. 
OF CONGRESS 64, 68 (1980).  The draft of the bill is reprinted in SUPPLEMENT , supra  note 55, at 
246.  Butler was not one of the great minds of the Convention, and it is certainly likely that he 
collaborated in drafting the provision with someone else, especially Charles Pinckney.  It 
seems clear, however, that Butler was the delegate who actually introduced, and pushed for, 
the fugitive slave provision at the Convention.  In any event, the idea for the Fugitive Slave 
Clause probably came from the Northwest Ordinance, which the Congress, sitting in New 
York, had passed in July.  The Ordinance contained the first national fugitive slave provision. 
  
211  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 449. 
212  Id. 
213  Id. at 449. 
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meant the permission to import slaves.  An understanding on the two subjects of 
navigation and slavery, had taken place between those parts of the Union, which 
explains the vote on the Motion depending, as well as the language of Genl. 
Pinckney and others .214 
 
Other delegates confirm this analysis.  Luther Martin later reported that  
 
the eastern  States, notwithstanding their aversion to slavery, were very 
willing to indulge the southern States, at least with a temporary liberty to 
prosecute the slave trade, provided the southern States would in their turn 
gratify them, by laying no restriction on navigation acts; and after a very 
little time, the committee by a great majority, agreed on a report, by which 
the general government was to be prohibited from preventing the 
importation of slaves for a limited time, and the restrictive clause relative to 
navigation acts was to be omitted.215 
 
Subsequent debate confirmed that New Englanders and South Carolinians had 
indeed struck a bargain.  Butler, for example, declared that the interests of the southern 
and eastern states were “as different as the interests of Russia and Turkey.”216  
Nevertheless, he was “desirous of conciliating the affections of the East” and so 
opposed the two-thirds requirement.217  The Virginians, who had opposed the slave 
trade provisions, now supported the demand for a two-thirds requirement for 
commercial legislation.  But they were in the minority.  South Carolina joined all the 
northern states to defeat the motion to require a two-thirds vote to regulate commerce.  
The Convention then adopted the clause allowing a simply majority to regulate 
commerce.218 
                                                 
214  Id. 
215  Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland 
Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention Lately Held at Philadelphia, in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 61 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).  Martin, who later opposed the Constitu-
tion, made this point in his letter to the Maryland ratifying convention.  He had been on the committee 
that drafted the compromise over commerce and the slave trade.   
216  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 451. 
217  Id. 
218  Id. at 451-53.  Other scholars have noted this compromise as well, but most have done so 
approvingly.  Charles Warren believed that slavery was relatively insignificant in the making of the 
Constitution.  Arguing that the morality of the slave trade was unimportant, he wrote that “historians 
have underestimated the importance of the concession made on commerce by the South.”  He 
approvingly quoted George Ticknor Curtis: “The just and candid voice of History has also to thank the 
Southern statesmen who consented to this arrangement for having clothed a majority of the two 
Houses with a full commercial power.”  WARREN, supra  note 48, at 585 n.2 (quoting CURTIS, 2 HISTORY 
OF THE ORIGIN, FORMATION, AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES  306-307 
(1858)).  Curtis was a northern ally of the South--a doughface in the language of antebellum America--
38
Akron Law Review, Vol. 32 [1999], Iss. 3, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol32/iss3/1
1999] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE MASTER CLASS 
 
Immediately after this vote, Butler reintroduced the fugitive slave clause.  Without 
debate or recorded vote, it too passed.219  The last bargain over slavery had been made. 
 The northerners who had opposed the fugitive slave provision only a day before were 
now silent. 
 
The debates of late August reveal how willing the northern delegates--especially the 
New Englanders--were to support slavery and the demands of the Deep South.  Some 
years ago William W. Freehling argued the slave trade clause was adopted to “lure 
Georgia and South Carolina into the Union.”220  The Convention debates, however, 
suggest that the Deep South did not need to be lured into the Union; the delegates from 
the Carolinas and Georgia were already deeply committed to the Constitution by the 
time the slave trade debate occurred.  Moreover, the South had already won major 
concessions on the three-fifths clause and the prohibition on taxing exports.  These 
were permanent features of the Constitution, unlike the slave trade provision, which 
would lapse in twenty years.  Although some southerners talked of not joining the Union 
unless the slave trade were allowed, it seems unlikely they would have risked going it 
alone over a temporary right of importation.221   
 
This prospect is even more unlikely because at the time of the Convention none of 
these states was actively importing slaves from Africa.  This fact cuts against Professor 
Earl Maltz’s recent contention that giving Congress the “authority to ban the importation 
of new slaves” would “have done serious damage to the economies of a number of 
southern states.”222  From 1787 until 1803 South Carolina did not import any slaves 
from Africa.223  From 1803 to 1808 South Carolina imported about 45,000 new 
                                                                                                                         
and his history clearly reflected his political biases.  Warren’s analysis follows Max Farrand, 
Compromises of the Constitution, 1 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR 
THE YEAR 1903, at 73-84 (1904).  The historiography of this issue is discussed in LYND, supra note 21, at 
153-83. 
219  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 453-54. 
220  Freehling, supra  note 27, at 84.  
221  Freehling has recently reiterated his position, calling mine “cynical.”  Freehling writes 
that “I believe Carolinians meant their ultimatum--and that the majority of convention 
delegates so believed too.”  WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, 1 THE ROAD TO DISUNION:  SECESSIONISTS 
AT BAY, 1776-1854, at 584, n.30 (1990).  However, Freehling seems to hedge a little, by also 
noting that Jefferson was “not present to cave in when South Carolina threatened not to join 
the Union if the Constitutional Convention of 1787 empowered Congress to end the African 
slave trade immediately.” Id. at 135.  It strikes me that “cave in” is much more on the mark, and 
implies that there might have been greater room for tough negotiation or actually opposition 
to this position. 
222  Maltz, supra  note 34, at 469. 
223  DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY 699, 701 (Randall M. Miller and John David 
Smith eds., 1988). 
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slaves.224  These importations created enormous human tragedies for the individual 
victims of the trade--and they doubtless provided huge profits to individual importers 
and purchasers--but these importations did not dramatically affect the economy of 
South Carolina or the deep south.   
 
The arguments of Freehling and Maltz rest on the assumption that the states of the 
Deep South would have rejected the Constitution over the right to import slaves in the 
future when they in fact were not currently importing them.  Furthermore, even 
without constitutional protection for the slave trade, importations from Africa would 
have been legal until the Congress actually took the time, and mustered the votes, to 
prohibit them.  At no time did the Convention consider a clause flatly prohibiting the 
trade; the entire debate was over whether the Constitution would explicitly protect the 
trade.  Earl Maltz writes that “under the Articles of Confederation, no federal action 
against the slave trade was possible; if this is the appropriate starting point then even a 
delayed grant of authority over the importation of slaves must be considered anti-
slavery and nationalistic.”225  However, this analysis ignores the fact that the slave trade 
clause is a specific exception to the general rule giving Congress complete power to 
regulate all commerce but slave importation.  In essence, the Convention granted 
Congress the general power to regulate all international commerce except the African 
slave trade.  It is not surprising that the South Carolina delegation considered this a 
great victory for their special interest in slave importations. 
 
However one views the African trade, it is hard to see how anyone could assert that 
the fugitive slave clause was also a “lure.”226  Added at the last possible moment, 
without any serious debate or discussion, this clause was a boon to the South without 
any quid pro quo for the North.  On this vote the northern delegates either did not 
understand the importance of the issue or were too tired to fight it. 
 
The August debates also reveal that the northern delegates could have had no 
illusions about the nature of the covenant they were forming with the South.  The 
northern delegates could not have forgotten General C. C. Pinckney’s earlier assertion 
that “S. Carolina and Georgia cannot do without slaves.”227  While the “Fathers liked to 
call [slavery] temporary,” the evidence of the Convention shows they should have 
known better.228  Throughout the Convention the delegates from the slave states made 
no attempt to hide the fact that they believed slavery would be a permanent part of their 
culture and society.  No one who attended the Philadelphia Convention could have 
believed that slavery was “temporary” in the South. 
                                                 
224  Id.  Over 100,000 slaves were brought from Africa between adoption of the 
Constitution and 1808.  Id. at 678. 
225  Maltz, supra  note 34, at 469. 
226  Freehling, supra  note 27, at 84. 
227  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 371. 
228  Freehling, supra  note 27, at 84. 
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 VI.  TOWARD SECTIONAL HARMONY 
 
With the adoption of the commerce clause and the fugitive slave clause, the issues of 
immediate concern to slaveowners seemed to be settled.  However, on August 30 the 
debate over the domestic violence clause of what became Article IV of the Constitution 
led to renewed conflicts over slavery.  Dickinson of Delaware attempted to delete the 
limitation that permitted the national government to intervene to prevent violence only 
“on the application” of a state legislature.229  This change would have allowed the 
national government, and not the states, to determine when intervention was necessary. 
 The Convention quickly defeated this motion, with the five slave states voting no, 
apparently because they did not want the national government to interfere in their 
domestic affairs.230  However, on a vote to change the wording of the clause from 
“domestic violence” to “insurrections,” the four slave states south of Virginia voted yes, 
but the motion lost five to six.231  Fear of slave insurrections no doubt motivated the 
South to wish for explicit protection on this matter. 
 
The Convention now turned to the numerous proposals which had been tabled 
throughout the summer.  North-South cooperation was quite evident through the next 
two weeks.  Motions introduced by a delegate from one section were often seconded 
by one from the other.  Although some patterns of sectional voting can be found in 
these debates, they are rare and may be more coincidental than significant.232   Some 
delegates, particularly Mason of Virginia, raised sectional fears.  But by this time Mason 
was so clearly opposed to the Constitution that he was apparently willing to make any 
argument to derail the work of the Convention.233 
 
Even on that divisive issue--the slave trade--the sectional compromise held.  On 
September 10, the last day of debate before the Constitution went to a final Committee 
of Style, John Rutledge of South Carolina noted his opposition to the amendment 
procedure because “the articles relating to slaves might be altered by the [s]tates not 
                                                 
229  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 466. 
230  Id. at 467. 
231  Id.  The vote on the Dickinson motion was three to eight.  The three yes votes came 
from the middle states, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware.  Id.  Delaware was also a 
slave state, and would remain one until the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865.  
But, by this time in the Convention, it was clear that Delaware did not think of itself as a slave 
state. 
232  For example, in a vote to limit the president’s treaty power, Maryland, South Carolina, 
and Georgia voted yes, and the other states present voted no.  Id. at 541. 
233  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 537-38, 541-542, 543.  On Aug. 31 he had declared “that he 
would sooner chop off his right hand than put it to the Constitution.”  Id. at 479.  Ultimately, 
he refused to sign the Constitution.  On Sept. 12 Mason would use sectional arguments in an 
attempt to create a stronger prohibition on states levying an export tax.  Id. at 588-89, 631. 
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interested in that property and prejudiced against it.”234  At Rutledge’s insistence the 
Convention added a clause forbidding any amendment of the slave trade provision and 
the capitation tax provision before 1808.235   As they had throughout the Convention, 
the delegates from the deep South left almost nothing to chance in their zeal to protect 
slavery. 
 
Emerging from the Committee of Style on September 14, the penultimate version of 
the Constitution produced further debate on issues relating to slavery and sectionalism.  
On September 15 an attempt to increase the representation of North Carolina in the First 
Congress failed, on a strictly sectional vote.236  Similarly, the Convention rejected an 
attempt to change the clause on export taxes to make it yet more favorable to the 
South.237  Here, however, Maryland and South Carolina joined the North in defeating 
the measure.238  The Convention’s last substantive action on slavery-related matters 
concerned the fugitive slave clause.  The Committee of Style had reported the clause 
with the language “No person legally held to service or labour in one state, escaping into 
another, shall ... be discharged from such service or labour . . . . ”239  The Convention 
substituted the term “under the laws thereof” after the word state for the term “legally.” 
 The delegates made this change “in compliance with the wish of some who thought the 
term [legal] equivocal, and favoring the idea that slavery was legal in a moral view.”240  
This was a minor victory for those who were squeamish about slavery, but it had no 
practical effect. 
 
 VII.  THE PROSLAVERY COMPACT  
 
This final compromise over the wording of the fugitive slave clause was an entirely 
appropriate way to end discussion of  slavery at the Convention.  Throughout the 
Convention the  delegates had fought over the place of slavery in the  Constitution.  A 
few delegates had expressed moral qualms over slavery, but most of the criticism had 
been political and  economic.  Northerners opposed representation for slavery because  
it would give the South a political advantage; Virginians opposed the slave trade, at least 
                                                 
234  Id. at 559. 
235  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 559. 
236  Id. at 623-24. 
237  Id. at 624. 
238  Id. 
239  Id. at 601-02. 
240  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 628.  There is no indication who requested this change.  
A similar change of wording was made in the three-fifths clause at the suggestion of Edmund 
Randolph, changing the word “servitude” to “service” for describing indentured whites.  
Randolph argued that the original term “being thought to express the condition of slaves” 
would be inappropriate, while the new term described “the obligations of free persons.”  Id. at 
607.  There was also a little more discussion about the amendment clause as it affected the 
slave trade, but nothing resulted from this.  Id. at 629. 
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in part, because it would undermine the value of their excess slaves.  The initial reaction 
to the fugitive slave clause typified this.  When Pierce Butler and Charles Pinckney first 
proposed it, James Wilson complained, “This would oblige the Executive of the State to 
do it, at the public expence.”241  The costs Wilson worried about were more financial 
than moral. 
 
The word “slavery” was never mentioned in the Constitution, yet its presence was 
felt everywhere.  The new wording of the fugitive slave clause was characteristic.  
Fugitive slaves were called “persons owing service or Labour,” and the word “legally” 
was omitted so as not to offend northern sensibilities.  Northern delegates could return 
home asserting that the Constitution did not recognize the legality of slavery.  In the 
most technical linguistic sense they were perhaps right.  Southerners, on the other 
hand, could tell their neighbors, as General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney told his, “We 
have obtained a right to recover our slaves in whatever part of America they may take 
refuge, which is a right we had not before.”242 
 
Indeed, the slave states had obtained significant concessions at the Convention.  
Through the three-fifths clause they gained extra representation in Congress.  Through 
the electoral college their votes for president were far more potent than the votes of 
northerners.  The prohibition on export taxes favored the products of slave labor.  The 
slave trade clause guaranteed their right to import new slaves for at least twenty years.  
The domestic violence clause guaranteed them federal aid if they should need it to 
suppress a slave rebellion.  The limited nature of federal power and the cumbersome 
amendment process guaranteed that, as long as they remained in the Union, their system 
of labor and race relations would remain free from national interference.  On every 
issue at the Convention, slaveowners had won major concessions from the rest of the 
nation, and with the exception of the commerce clause they had given up very little to 
win these concessions.  The northern delegates had been eager for a stronger Union 
with a national court system and a unified commercial system.  Although some had 
expressed concern over the justice or safety of slavery, in the end they were able to 
justify their compromises and ignore their qualms. 
 
At the close of the Convention two delegates, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts and 
George Mason of Virginia, explained why they could not sign the document they had 
helped create.  Both had a plethora of objections that included slavery-related issues.  
But their objections were not grounded in moral or philosophical opposition to slavery; 
rather, like the arguments of those delegates who ultimately supported the compromises 
over slavery, the objections of Gerry and Mason were practical and political.  Gerry 
objected to the three-fifths clause because it gave the South too much political power, 
at the expense of New England.243  Mason opposed allowing the slave trade to continue, 
                                                 
241  Id. at 443. 
242  4 DEBATES , supra  note 20, at 286. 
243  2 RECORDS, supra  note 16, at 633. 
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because “such importations render the United States weaker, more vulnerable, and less 
capable of defence.”244 
 
During the ratification struggles others would take more principled stands against the 
compromises over slavery.  A New Yorker complained that the Constitution condoned 
“drenching the bowels of Africa in gore, for the sake of enslaving its free-born innocent 
inhabitants.”245  In New Hampshire, Joshua Atherton opposed ratification because it 
would make all Americans “consenters to, and partakers in, the sin and guilt of this 
abominable traffic.”246  A Virginian thought the slave trade provision was an “excellent 
clause” for “an Algerian constitution: but not so well calculated (I hope) for the latitude 
of America.”247 
 
It was more than just the slave trade that northern antifederalists feared.  Three 
opponents of the Constitution in Massachusetts noted that the Constitution bound the 
states together as a “whole” and “the states” were “under obligation . . . reciprocally to 
aid each other in defence[sic] and support of every thing to which they are entitled 
thereby, right or wrong.”248  Thus, they might be called to suppress a slave revolt or in 
some other way defend the institution.  They could not predict how slavery might 
entangle them in the future, but they did know that “this lust for slavery, [was] 
portentous of much evil in America, for the cry of innocent blood, . . . hath 
undoubtedly reached to the Heavens, to which that cry is always directed, and will 
draw down upon them vengeance adequate to the enormity of the crime.”249 
 
The events of 1861-1865 would prove the three Massachusetts antifederalists of 
1788 correct.  Only after a civil war of unparalleled bloodshed and three constitutional 
amendments could the Union be made more perfect, by finally expunging slavery from 
the Constitution.   
 
The task of overcoming this history and heritage, however, remains before us, 
nearly a century and a half after the end of slavery.  How we solve the problem of 
slavery, and its legacy of race discrimination is the problem of the twenty-first century. 
                                                 
244  Id. at 640. 
245  Letters from a Countryman from Duchess County (Jan. 22, 1788), in 6 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 215, at 62. 
246  2 DEBATES , supra  note 20, at 203. 
247  Essays by Republicus (Mar. 12, 1788), in 5 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 
215, at 169. 
248  Consider Arms, Malichi Maynard, and Samuel Field, “Reasons for Dissent,” in 4 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra  note 215, at 262-63. 
249  Id. 
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